Campbell University School of Law

Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

2014

Refining Per Se Unfair Trade Practices
Matthew W. Sawchak
Campbell University School of Law, sawchakm@campbell.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/fac_sw

Recommended Citation
Matthew W. Sawchak, Refining Per Se Unfair Trade Practices, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1881 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/fac_sw/99

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Repository @
Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized
administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.
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REFINING PER SE UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES*
MATTHEW W. SAWCHAK**
North Carolina’s “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” statute,
section 75-1.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes, is a central
feature of North Carolina litigation. The statute allows lucrative
remedies, but it defines prohibited conduct with only vague
standards. Courts have difficulty applying these standards in any
detail, so they often use analytical shortcuts in decisions under
the statute.
One key shortcut under section 75-1.1 is the “per se violation.” A
per se violation arises when actions that violate a source of law
outside section 75-1.1—a different statute, a regulation, or a
nonstatutory doctrine—automatically violate section 75-1.1 as
well. A per se violation has a transformative effect: in one stroke,
it turns a claim for single damages into a claim for treble
damages and possible attorney fees.
Courts in section 75-1.1 cases have struggled to decide when to
carry out, and when to refuse, this transformation. They have
accepted and rejected per se theories with no explanation or with
question-begging explanations. They have also sidestepped the
problems with a per se theory by applying a number of
variations on per se theories. This variety of approaches leaves
courts and lawyers to guess at what analysis to apply in future
cases.
The courts can end this confusion by sharpening the per se
theory and replacing parts of it. In many instances, the General
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Assembly has announced, directly or indirectly, that a violation
of a given statute is also a violation of section 75-1.1. Courts
should continue to apply these per se violations. In all other
cases, however, courts should ask whether the conduct that
makes up a separate violation satisfies the tests for unfairness
under section 75-1.1. The tests for unfairness already address
violations of separate statutes and other expressions of public
policy. This streamlined approach will strengthen the analysis of
per se and non-per-se violations alike.
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INTRODUCTION
Section 75-1.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes is a
prominent feature of North Carolina litigation. The statute condemns
an undefined category of conduct: “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.”1 A claim under section 75-1.1 is “a boilerplate claim in
most every complaint based on a commercial or consumer transaction
in North Carolina.”2
Two factors make section 75-1.1 claims so common. First, a
violation of the statute triggers powerful remedies: automatic treble
damages, plus an opportunity to recover attorney fees.3 Second, the
definition of conduct that violates section 75-1.1 is so vague that

1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (2013). This Article refers to this statute as “section
75-1.1.” This phrasing mirrors the phrasing in recent North Carolina appellate opinions.
See, e.g., Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 367 N.C. 81, 747 S.E.2d 220 (2013).
The title of this Article uses the phrase “unfair trade practices” because lawyers
and judges recognize this phrase most readily. See GE Betz, Inc. v. Conrad, __ N.C. App.
__, __, 752 S.E.2d 634, 650 n.6 (2013) (noting that the phrase “unfair or deceptive trade
practices” still “remains common in legal parlance today”), petition for disc. rev. filed, No.
111P10-2 (N.C. Jan. 7, 2014); NOEL L. ALLEN, NORTH CAROLINA UNFAIR BUSINESS
PRACTICE § 1.01, at 1-1 (3d ed. 2014) (making a similar point).
2. Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 347 (4th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Allied Distribs., Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 847 F. Supp. 376, 379 (E.D.N.C.
1993)).
3. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-16, -16.1.
For other statutes that allow automatic treble damages, see, for example, Clayton
Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
Act § 4(c), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-8(c) (North Carolina’s RICO
statute).
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unless a categorical exemption applies, there is almost always a
credible prospect that a claim will succeed.4
Because the conduct standard under section 75-1.1 is vague,
courts struggle to apply the statute consistently and to explain their
decisions.5 Courts often avoid these struggles by applying judicially
created exemptions or other analytical shortcuts.6
A key type of shortcut under section 75-1.1 is the “per se
violation.” A per se violation occurs when actions that violate a
standard outside section 75-1.1—a separate statute, a regulation, or a
common-law doctrine—automatically violate section 75-1.1 as well.7
A per se theory has a powerful effect: it turns a claim that offers
only single damages into a claim that offers treble damages and
possible attorney fees.8 Indeed, a per se theory can produce these

4. See, e.g., Matthew W. Sawchak & Kip D. Nelson, Defining Unfairness in “Unfair
Trade Practices,” 90 N.C. L. REV. 2033, 2043–50 (2012) (discussing the standards for
violations of section 75-1.1).
5. See, e.g., id. at 2051–54; see also Thomas A. Farr, Unfair and Deceptive Legislation:
The Case for Finding North Carolina General Statutes Section 75-1.1 Unconstitutionally
Vague as Applied to an Alleged Breach of a Commercial Contract, 8 CAMPBELL L. REV.
421, 426–32 (1986) (describing the unpredictable application of section 75-1.1 and arguing
that, at least in non-consumer cases, the statute is unconstitutionally vague).
6. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 362, 396
(M.D.N.C. 2002) (holding that the failure of federal antitrust claims defeated a section 751.1 claim “for essentially the same reasons”), aff’d mem., 67 F. App’x 810 (4th Cir. 2003);
White v. Thompson, 364 N.C. 47, 53, 691 S.E.2d 676, 680 (2010) (holding that section 751.1 does not apply to a business’s internal operations); Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at
2053–56 (noting these and other analytical shortcuts).
7. Per se violations of section 75-1.1 resemble cases of negligence per se in tort law.
Negligence per se allows a statute or regulation to become a standard that creates liability
for negligence, whether or not the predicate violation itself would otherwise create civil
liability. See, e.g., Baldwin v. GTE S., Inc., 335 N.C. 544, 546, 439 S.E.2d 108, 109 (1994)
(stating the North Carolina standard for negligence per se). See generally Robert F.
Blomquist, The Trouble with Negligence Per Se, 61 S.C. L. REV. 221 (2009) (laying out the
disorderly state of the doctrine of negligence per se and proposing partial solutions).
In antitrust law, in contrast, a per se theory does not involve the relationship
between a separate source of law and antitrust doctrine. Instead, it is a streamlined way of
applying antitrust doctrine itself. A per se rule treats certain “categories of restraints as
necessarily illegal, eliminat[ing] the need to study the reasonableness of an individual
restraint in light of the real market forces at work.” Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007). But cf. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS 376 & n.7 (2009) (using the term “per
se” to refer to specific lists of prohibited conduct in statutes similar to section 75-1.1); John
F. Graybeal, Unfair Trade Practices, Antitrust and Consumer Welfare in North Carolina, 80
N.C. L. REV. 1927, 1956–57 (2002) (discussing the occasional role of section 75-1.1 as an
antitrust statute).
8. See, e.g., Kettle v. Leonard, No. 7:11-CV-189-BR, 2012 WL 4086595, at *12
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 2012) (treating a fraud claim as a per se violation of section 75-1.1 and
awarding treble damages as a result); Trantham v. Michael L. Martin, Inc., __ N.C. App.
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remedies even when an underlying violation allows no private
recovery at all.9
Although per se violations of section 75-1.1 have existed for
almost forty years,10 courts have not developed reliable standards to
decide when per se violations will and will not arise.11 In one recent
decision, for example, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated
that courts recognize per se violations “only where the regulatory
__, __, 745 S.E.2d 327, 335 (2013) (doing the same with claims for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation).
9. See, e.g., Guessford v. Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 652, 660
(M.D.N.C. 2013) (noting that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(11) creates no private right of
action, but then stating: “[I]f Plaintiff can prove that Defendant acted in a way that
violated § 58-63-15(11) . . . then Plaintiff will be able to establish his [section 75-1.1] claim
and thereby may seek treble damages arising from the alleged [section 75-1.1] violation”).
10. See Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975) (“Proof of fraud
would necessarily constitute a violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive
acts . . . .”).
11. See infra notes 44–81, 139–63 and accompanying text (analyzing the case law on
per se violations).
Likewise, the nationwide literature on statutes like section 75-1.1 does not analyze
standards for per se violations in depth. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
supra note 7, at 376 (describing explicit per se provisions in some states’ statutes);
ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW SEC., STATE BAR OF CAL., CALIFORNIA
ANTITRUST AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW § 16.04[B], at 16-19 to -22 (Cheryl Lee
Johnson ed., rev. ed. 2013) (discussing which federal and California statutes can be
“predicate acts” that establish a violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law);
CAROLYN L. CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND
PRACTICES §§ 3.2.7.3 to .4 (8th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2013) (discussing potential sources of per
se violations, but not standards for creating or rejecting per se violations); MICHAEL C.
GILLERAN, THE LAW OF CHAPTER 93A § 4.14 (2d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2013) (volume 52 in
MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES) (discussing standards for per se violations under the
Massachusetts statute); J. CLARK KELSO, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES LITIGATION (1995)
(containing no discussion of per se violations); ROBERT M. LANGER ET AL.,
CONNECTICUT UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES, BUSINESS TORTS AND ANTITRUST § 2.8, at
87–94 (2013-2014 ed.) (volume 12 in CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES) (describing cases
in which courts have recognized other violations as per se violations of the Connecticut
Unfair Trade Practices Act); 1 DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER
PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 3:27, at 156–66 (2013-2014 ed.) (listing instances in which
violations of state or federal statutes have established per se violations of a statute like
section 75-1.1); Mark S. Fistos, Per Se Violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act, 76 FLA. B.J. 62, 62–64 (2002) (discussing standards for per se violations of
the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act); James A. McKenna, Consumer
Protection and the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 9 ME. B.J. 78, 80 (1994) (listing specific
statutes that constitute “per se and prima facie evidence” violations of the Maine Unfair
Trade Practices Act); Jonathan A. Mark, Comment, Dispensing with the Public Interest
Requirement in Private Causes of Action Under the Washington Consumer Protection Act,
29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 205, 212–13 (2005) (discussing contradictory holdings on the test
for a per se violation of Washington’s statute like section 75-1.1); Joseph Thomas
Moldovan, Comment, New York Creates a Private Right of Action to Combat Consumer
Fraud: Caveat Venditor, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 509, 560–61 (1982) (arguing that New York
courts should recognize per se violations of New York’s statute).
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statute [that creates the underlying violation] specifically defines and
proscribes conduct which is unfair or deceptive within the meaning of
[section] 75-1.1.”12 If one could identify “conduct which is unfair or
deceptive” as easily as this passage assumes, there would be little
need for per se violations. Unclear standards like these have
produced muddled doctrine.13
In part because of the underdeveloped standards for per se
violations, courts have improvised a number of variations on per se
theories—approaches that give some weight to other violations, but
do not treat them as automatic violations of section 75-1.1. The case
law reveals at least four of these variations.14 Courts have not
explained why these approaches exist. Nor have they explained when
each approach applies.
This Article proposes that courts end this chaos by sharpening
the per se theory and replacing parts of it with better-established
doctrine.
In many statutes, the North Carolina General Assembly has
announced expressly, or almost expressly, that a violation of a given
statute is a violation of section 75-1.1.15 Courts should continue to
treat these statutes as sources of per se violations. In the absence of
such a statement by the legislature, however, courts should not apply
a per se analysis or any of its variants. Instead, courts should ask
whether the conduct that makes up a separate violation satisfies, on a
non-per-se basis, the test for unfairness under section 75-1.1.16

12. Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 170, 681 S.E.2d
448, 454 (2009) (emphasis deleted).
Although this language might imply that the court of appeals was requiring an
explicit cross-reference to section 75-1.1, the rest of the decision shows that the court was
not. See id. at 170 n.3, 171, 681 S.E.2d at 454 n.3, 455 (treating statutes without any explicit
cross-reference to section 75-1.1 as ones that met the court’s “specifically define and
proscribe” test).
13. See, e.g., In re Fifth Third Bank, Nat’l Ass’n—Vill. of Penland Litig., 217 N.C.
App. 199, 207, 719 S.E.2d 171, 176 (2011) (“[A] violation of a consumer protection statute
may, in some instances, constitute a per se violation of [section 75-1.1].” (emphasis added
and deleted)); Battleground Veterinary Hosp., P.C. v. McGeough, No. 05 CVS 18918,
2007 WL 3071618, at *8 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007) (“[P]roof of an independent tort
generally is sufficient to make out a separate [section 75-1.1] claim.” (emphasis added)).
14. See infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
15. See ALLEN, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-8 n.22 (listing statutes with explicit crossreferences to section 75-1.1).
16. That test provides, in relevant part, that “[a] practice is unfair when it offends
established public policy.” E.g., Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 72,
653 S.E.2d 393, 399 (2007) (quoting Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397,
403 (1981)).
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Sources that define unfairness show how to analyze violations of
separate statutes, regulations, and other expressions of public policy.17
This streamlined analysis will give courts, lawyers, and clients a
consistent way to decide how violations of other sources of law affect
claims under section 75-1.1. It will also give the General Assembly an
incentive to create per se violations expressly when it intends them.
Finally, by unifying the case law on per se violations with the case law
on public-policy-based violations of section 75-1.1, the proposed
analysis will help courts refine both theories under the statute.
Part I of this Article gives an overview of section 75-1.1, its
history, and litigation under the statute. Part II describes the current
doctrine on per se violations of section 75-1.1. Part III discusses the
problems with the current standards for per se violations and related
theories. Part IV proposes solutions to these problems. Specifically, it
proposes that courts refocus the per se doctrine on legislatively
declared violations and replace the remaining theories in this area
with parts of the unfairness doctrine.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF SECTION 75-1.1
Section 75-1.1 provides that “[u]nfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.”18 The North Carolina
General Assembly enacted section 75-1.1 in 1969.19 The statute was
part of a nationwide wave of consumer-protection measures that
states enacted in the 1960s and early 1970s, partly at the
encouragement of the Federal Trade Commission.20
One mark of the FTC’s role in promoting section 75-1.1 is the
text of the statute, which mirrors the text of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.21 Because of this parallel statutory language,
17. See infra notes 221–34 and accompanying text.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (2013).
19. Act of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, § 1(b), 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930, 930 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2013)).
20. See, e.g., Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 543, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981); ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 7, at 375; Graybeal, supra note 7, at 1933–34;
William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 730
(1972).
21. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (“Unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
declared unlawful.”), with 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,
are hereby declared unlawful.”). See generally Robert Morgan, The People’s Advocate in
the Marketplace—The Role of the North Carolina Attorney General in the Field of
Consumer Protection, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRAMURAL L. REV. 1, 18–20 (1969) (discussing
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North Carolina courts have said that in section 75-1.1 cases, they take
guidance from authorities under section 5.22
A section 75-1.1 claim offers lucrative private remedies.
Successful claims under the statute generate mandatory treble
damages.23 In addition, a prevailing plaintiff can recover attorney fees
if she proves that the defendant violated the statute willfully and
committed an “unwarranted refusal . . . to fully resolve the matter
which constitutes the basis of” a section 75-1.1 lawsuit.24
Unsurprisingly, claims under the statute have generated large verdicts
and settlements.25
Section 75-1.1 combines these lucrative remedies with a vague
test for liability. Unlike parallel statutes in most other states,26 section
75-1.1 does not contain a list of specifically prohibited business
practices. Instead, the courts have used broadly worded tests to assess
liability under the statute. According to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, “[a] practice is unfair when it offends established public
policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive,
unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers. [A] practice is
deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive.”27
the history of the enactment of section 75-1.1, including the intentional decision to follow
the language of section 5).
Given the close relationship between section 5 and state statutes like section 751.1, this Article uses the term “section 5 analogues” to describe state statutes that
condemn unfair and deceptive acts and practices (including but not limited to statutes with
a text that mirrors section 5). See, e.g., PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 11, § 2:10, at
41–43 (describing the multiple forms of section 5 analogues).
22. See, e.g., Henderson v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 346 N.C. 741, 749, 488 S.E.2d 234,
239 (1997) (stating that section 75-1.1 “is patterned after section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, and we look to federal case law for guidance in interpreting the statute”
(citation omitted)); see also Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2064–65 (discussing other
decisions to the same effect).
23. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16; Bhatti v. Buckland, 328 N.C. 240, 243, 400 S.E.2d
440, 442 (1991) (“If a violation of Chapter 75 is found, treble damages must be awarded.”).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1(1). Section 75-16.1 also allows reverse fee shifting if
“[t]he party instituting the action knew, or should have known, the action was frivolous
and malicious.” Id. § 75-16.1(2). Reverse fee awards under section 75-16.1, however, are
relatively rare. See ALLEN, supra note 1, § 11.10, at 11-35 to -42.
25. See, e.g., Large Verdicts & Settlements, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 31, 2011, at 8
(reporting a $10.1 million arbitration award on a counterclaim for “unfair/deceptive trade
practices”); Top Verdicts & Settlements, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Feb. 6, 2012, at 9 (reporting an
$8.7 million verdict for “unfair and deceptive trade practices”).
26. See, e.g., PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 11, app. 3B, at 174–76 (listing thirtyeight states and territories whose section 5 analogues include a list—in most cases, a
nonexclusive list—of prohibited acts).
27. Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 72, 653 S.E.2d 393, 399
(2007) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Marshall v. Miller, 302
N.C. 539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981)). As noted below, there are also three other
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The case law under section 75-1.1 reflects the open-ended nature
of these tests. For example, North Carolina courts have declined to
limit the statute to consumer claims or to buyer-seller relationships.28
A section 75-1.1 plaintiff, moreover, can prevail without showing a
defendant’s bad faith, intent, willfulness, or knowledge.29 Further, a
plaintiff’s contributory negligence is no defense to a claim under the
statute.30 As these examples suggest, the conduct standard under
section 75-1.1 is so broad that unless a categorical exemption applies,
there is almost always a credible prospect that a section 75-1.1 claim
will succeed.31
In view of the lucrative remedies and vague standards for claims
under section 75-1.1, it should be no surprise that North Carolina
lawyers include a section 75-1.1 claim in almost every lawsuit that
involves business conduct.32 Indeed, “[i]n modern business litigation
types of section 75-1.1 claims: (1) claims for unfair methods of competition, (2) claims
based on “aggravated” breaches of contracts, and (3) claims for per se violations of section
75-1.1. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 665, 370 S.E.2d 375, 389
(1988).
29. See, e.g., Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 544, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400–01 (1981).
30. See, e.g., Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 95–96, 331 S.E.2d 677,
680–81 (1985); cf. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1233, 1235
(M.D.N.C. 1996) (rejecting, on the facts, the defenses of unclean hands and in pari
delicto), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
31. To be sure, not every claim that has a prospect of success prevails in the end. For
example, in a recent case, a section 75-1.1 claim prevailed in the trial court and in the
North Carolina Court of Appeals, but was rejected in the Supreme Court of North
Carolina. Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 367 N.C. 81, 92, 747 S.E.2d 220, 229 (2013),
rev’g 215 N.C. App. 307, 718 S.E.2d 408 (2011).
32. See ALLEN, supra note 1, § 1.02, at 1-2 to -5 (commenting on the widespread
assertion of section 75-1.1 claims); Mack Sperling, The Business Court Takes a Narrow
View of When Claims Are “In or Affecting Commerce” Under Chapter 75 of the General
Statutes, N.C. BUS. LITIG. REP. (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport.com
/2014/01/articles/watching-the-court/the-business-court-takes-a-narrow-view-of-whenclaims-are-in-or-affecting-commerce-under-chapter-75-of-the-general-statutes
(same).
Indeed, courts have commented with disfavor on the ubiquity of section 75-1.1 claims. See,
e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 347 (4th Cir. 1998);
Veolia Water Solutions & Techs. Support v. Siemens Indus., No. 5:11-CV-296-FL, 2012
WL 4793472, at *2 n.2 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 9, 2012); Allied Distribs., Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing
Co., 847 F. Supp. 376, 379 (E.D.N.C. 1993).
This pattern is not limited to North Carolina. Across the country, the number of
claims under section 5 analogues more than doubled between 2000 and 2007. SEARLE
CIVIL JUSTICE INST., STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS: AN EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATION OF PRIVATE LITIGATION: PRELIMINARY REPORT, at xii, 19 (2009). A
recent study found that states (like North Carolina) with vague definitions of prohibited
conduct have more lawsuits—or at least more reported decisions—under their section 5
analogues than states with more clearly defined proscriptions have. Id. at 26.
Lawsuits under section 5 analogues, especially putative class actions under these
statutes, have grown increasingly controversial in recent years. This controversy has
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in North Carolina, it is increasingly rare to see a complaint that does
not contain a claim under” section 75-1.1.33 Over its forty-five-year
history, the statute has generated over 2000 reported decisions,34 to
say nothing of unreported decisions.
As section 75-1.1 claims have multiplied, several categories of
these claims have emerged. One can divide section 75-1.1 claims into
the following categories:
•

claims for per se violations of section 75-1.1;

•

claims of unfair methods of competition, which involve
alleged harm to the competitive process;

•

claims of deceptive conduct;

•

claims of aggravated breaches of contract; and

•

claims of unfair conduct alone.35

This Article focuses on per se violations of section 75-1.1. The
next part of this Article describes per se violations and related
theories in detail.
sparked proposals for state legislatures to narrow the scope of section 5 analogues. See,
e.g., JOANNA SHEPHERD-BAILEY, CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS OR CONSUMER
LITIGATION ACTS?: A HISTORICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF STATE CPAs 26–
27 (2014), available at http://atra.org/sites/default/files/documents/Shepherd-Bailey%20
White%20Paper%20-%20FINAL_0.pdf (praising recent legislation that narrowed
Tennessee’s section 5 analogue and suggesting that other states adopt similar—and
further—amendments); Dee Pridgen, Wrecking Ball Disguised as Reform: ALEC’s Model
Act on Private Enforcement of Consumer Protection Statutes, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE (forthcoming Apr. 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2426381 (describing, and criticizing, legislation proposed by the American
Legislative Exchange Council).
33. John Buford, Supreme Court Rejects Chapter 75 Claim Between Partners, N.C.
BUS. LITIG. REP. (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport.com/
2010/04/articles/fiduciary-duty/supreme-court-rejects-chapter-75-claim-between-partners
(emphasis added); accord Sperling, supra note 32 (“[T]here is not much doubt about why
[section 75-1.1 claims] are included in almost every Complaint in the [North Carolina
Business] Court. The prospect of treble damages (per G.S. § 75-16) and attorneys’ fees
(per G.S. § 75-16.1) is too tempting for many to pass up.”).
34. ALLEN, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 1-2. To analyze ongoing developments under
section 75-1.1, my colleagues and I recently launched a blog on the law under the statute.
See WHAT’S FAIR?: A BLOG ON THE LAW OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICES, http://www.unfairtradepracticesnc.com/.
35. See Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2050–56 (giving a detailed overview of
these types of claims).
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II. PER SE VIOLATIONS AND RELATED THEORIES
When one analyzes a section 75-1.1 claim, the most difficult
question is usually whether the facts satisfy the conduct standard
under the statute.36 Instead of addressing this conduct standard
directly, a party can bypass it by pursuing a per se theory. A per se
violation of section 75-1.1 occurs when a violation of another source
of law—a different statute, a regulation, or a nonstatutory duty—
automatically satisfies the conduct standard for a section 75-1.1
claim.37
For brevity, one can use the term “upgrading” to describe
converting a violation of another source of law to a violation of
section 75-1.1. One can call the violation of another source of law a
“predicate violation.” The other source of law can be called a
“predicate statute,” a “predicate regulation,” or the like.
Per se theories are important because of their decisive effect.
Under a per se theory, a plaintiff can show a violation of section 751.1 just by proving that a predicate violation has occurred.38 In
addition, once a court recognizes a given predicate violation as a per
se violation of section 75-1.1, that conclusion usually carries over to
all future instances of that predicate violation.39
The first per se case under section 75-1.1, Hardy v. Toler,40 was
decided six years after the statute was enacted. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina wrote: “Proof of fraud would necessarily constitute a

36. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 1-2 (“The broad wording of the statute
invites a quasi-constitutional form of case analysis. The courts have . . . [stated] that the
law is necessarily comprehensive and subject to case-by-case interpretation.”); supra notes
26–31 and accompanying text (describing the open-ended conduct standard under section
75-1.1).
37. See, e.g., CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 11, § 3.2, at 178 (giving a similar
definition); Fistos, supra note 11, at 62–63 (same).
38. See, e.g., State ex rel. Edmisten v. Zim Chem. Co., 45 N.C. App. 604, 607, 263
S.E.2d 849, 851 (1980) (“Upon application of [N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-571] to the facts in
this case, we find that defendant’s failure to properly label the drums of antifreeze
constitutes a misbranding [in violation of section 106-571]. . . . We think, therefore, and so
hold that defendant’s misbranding of the antifreeze, which is undisputed, is a deceptive
practice within the meaning of [section] 75-1.1 as a matter of law.”).
39. See, e.g., Kettle v. Leonard, No. 7:11-CV-189-BR, 2012 WL 4086595, at *12
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 2012) (“[P]roof of fraud, either actual or constructive, is sufficient, in
and of itself, to prove a violation of [section 75-1.1].” (citing Jones v. Harrelson & Smith
Contractors, LLC, 194 N.C. App. 203, 217, 670 S.E.2d 242, 252 (2008), aff’d, 363 N.C. 371,
677 S.E.2d 453 (2009))). But cf. Keister v. Nat’l Council of the Young Men’s Christian
Ass’n of the U.S., No. 12 CVS 1137, 2013 WL 3864583, at *3 (N.C. Bus. Ct. July 18, 2013)
(“Fraud or misrepresentation occurring during a commercial transaction is not a per se
violation of Chapter 75, but such conduct can be the basis of a claim under Chapter 75.”).
40. 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975).
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violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts . . . .”41
Applying this rule, the court moved directly from the conclusion that
the defendants had committed fraud to the conclusion that they had
violated section 75-1.1.42
Hardy illustrates one pattern of upgrading: selective upgrading.
In selective upgrading, the source of law for a predicate violation does
not expressly refer to section 75-1.1, but courts nonetheless upgrade
the predicate violation.43
Subsection A below outlines the existing patterns of upgrading
(selective and otherwise) under North Carolina law. Subsection B
identifies variations on per se analysis that have taken root in North
Carolina cases.
A. Patterns of Upgrading Under Section 75-1.1
North Carolina decisions recognize a per se violation of section
75-1.1 in three different patterns of reasoning:
•

Explicit upgrading, when the source of law for a predicate
violation expressly states that a violation of that source of law
is also a violation of section 75-1.1;

•

Semi-explicit upgrading, when the source of law simply
describes conduct as unfair or deceptive; and

•

Selective upgrading, when the source of law does not meet
either of the above tests, but the court nonetheless upgrades
the predicate violation.

This subsection describes these three patterns in turn. It then
discusses a decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina that cuts
through these patterns and announces a discrete limit on upgrading.
41. Id. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346 (emphasis added).
42. The court went on to state: “[W]e hold as a matter of law that the false
representations made by defendants to plaintiff constituted unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce contrary to the provisions of [section] 75-1.1 . . . .” Id. at 311, 218
S.E.2d at 347. The court in Hardy otherwise used the phrase “as a matter of law” to state
that a judge, rather than a jury, decides liability under section 75-1.1. See id. at 309–11, 218
S.E.2d at 346–47. This dual meaning of “as a matter of law” has caused confusion in later
cases. See infra notes 164–85 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Hardy, 288 N.C. at 309–10, 213 S.E.2d at 346 (upgrading fraud to a
section 75-1.1 violation by following, without further elaboration, D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC,
125 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1942)); infra notes 52–56, 139–63 and accompanying text
(discussing selective upgrading and problems with it).
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1. Explicit Upgrading
Explicit upgrading occurs when the source of law for a predicate
violation specifically refers to section 75-1.1. For example, North
Carolina’s state trademark statute provides that infringement or
fraudulent registration of a state-law trademark “constitutes a
violation of G.S. 75-1.1.”44 About forty-five North Carolina statutes
contain similar cross-references.45 When a source of law contains an
explicit cross-reference to section 75-1.1, courts recognize per se
violations of section 75-1.1 without difficulty.46
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-12 (2013).
45. See ALLEN, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-8 n.22 (listing these statutes); id. §§ 3.01 to
.06, at 3-1 to -31 (describing many of these statutes and related case law).
Explicit upgrading plays an even greater role in Texas, where the section 5
analogue limits per se theories to instances of explicit upgrading. See TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.43 (West 2011) (“A violation of a provision of law other than this
subchapter is not in and of itself a violation of this subchapter. An act or practice that is a
violation of a provision of law other than this subchapter may be made the basis of an
action under this subchapter if the act or practice is proscribed by a provision of this
subchapter or is declared by such other law to be actionable under this subchapter.”).
Although North Carolina has no limiting provision like the one in the Texas
statute, North Carolina courts have sometimes reached equivalent results through
statutory interpretation. They have reasoned that when the legislature refers to section 751.1 in certain statutes but not others, it implicitly disapproves upgrading violations of the
statutes without the cross-references. See, e.g., Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 192 N.C. App.
298, 318, 665 S.E.2d 767, 780 (2008); see also Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc.,
243 F.3d 789, 804–05 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying the same analysis to predicate federal
statutes). But see Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Servs., Inc., 108 N.C. App.
169, 172, 423 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1992) (“[T]he fact that the Trade Secrets Protection Act was
not one of the regulatory statutes specifically listed in Chapter 66 as violative of [section]
75-1.1 is immaterial. This Court has repeatedly held that the violation of regulatory
statutes which govern business activities may also be a violation of [section] 75-1.1 whether
or not such activities are listed specifically in the regulatory act as a violation of [section]
75-1.1.”).
46. See, e.g., Oset v. Interstate Brokerage of the Se., Inc., No. 5:99-CV-185-BO(2),
1999 WL 33236225, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 30, 1999) (“Since the Court has already found
that Defendant violated [North Carolina’s Business Opportunity Sales Act], and N.C.G.S.
§ 66-100 of [that Act] provides that ‘[t]he violation of any provisions of this Article shall
constitute an unfair practice under G.S. § 75-1.1,’ it follows that this Court must find that
Defendant violated N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 . . . .” (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-100(e))), aff’d
per curiam, No. 00-1029, 2000 WL 1853332, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 19, 2000); Ferrmily Corp.
v. Amodeo, No. 01 CVS 12596, 2002 WL 34192854, at *2 (Wake Cnty., N.C. Super. Ct.
Aug. 23, 2002) (upgrading a violation of the North Carolina trademark statutes, relying on
the explicit cross-reference to section 75-1.1 in those statutes); cf. Llera v. Sec. Credit Sys.,
Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 674, 677 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (treating a claim under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-70-130(c), which explicitly refers to section 75-1.1, as an implicit claim under section
75-1.1).
For one major predicate statute, the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act,
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to -157, some decisions have applied explicit upgrading
mistakenly. They have done so by citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-146, an explicit-upgrading
provision in a neighboring, but unrelated statute. See, e.g., Med. Staffing Network, Inc. v.
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2. Semi-Explicit Upgrading
Semi-explicit upgrading occurs when the source of law for a
predicate violation does not refer to section 75-1.1, but calls certain
conduct unfair or deceptive.
To date, the only successful instance of semi-explicit upgrading in
North Carolina involves N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-63-15(1), which bans
false and misleading statements about the terms of insurance
policies.47 In Jefferson-Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Spencer,48 the
Supreme Court of North Carolina stated: “[A] violation of [section]
58-63-15(1) is an unfair and deceptive practice under [section] 751.1.”49
When a court, like the court in Jefferson-Pilot, writes that a
predicate statute that says “unfair or deceptive” is a per se violation
of section 75-1.1, the court appears to be stating one or both of two
conclusions. First, the court might be concluding that the legislature
has announced a section 75-1.1 violation explicitly, but without citing

Ridgway, 194 N.C. App. 649, 659–60, 670 S.E.2d 321, 329 (2009) (committing this error);
Akzo Nobel Coatings Inc. v. Rogers, No. 11 CVS 3013, 2011 WL 5316772, at *23 (N.C.
Bus. Ct. Nov. 3, 2011) (same); see also Awarepoint Corp. v. Noel, No. 11 CVS 19136, 2012
WL 2603309, ¶ 23 n.1 (N.C. Bus. Ct. May 14, 2012) (pointing out this error in the above
decisions).
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(1) (stating, without literally referring to section
75-1.1, that misrepresentations of the terms of insurance policies “are hereby defined as
unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices”).
In a case that involved mobile-home regulations, the North Carolina courts nearly
applied semi-explicit upgrading again, but ultimately refused. The North Carolina Court
of Appeals applied semi-explicit upgrading, but the Supreme Court of North Carolina
reversed that part of the decision. See Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 176 N.C.
App. 668, 672, 627 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2006), aff’d in part and modified in part, 362 N.C. 63,
71–72, 653 S.E.2d 393, 399 (2007); see also infra notes 58–80, 252–57 and accompanying
text (discussing these aspects of Walker).
48. 336 N.C. 49, 442 S.E.2d 316 (1994).
49. Id. at 53, 442 S.E.2d at 318 (emphasis added) (attributing this rule to Pearce v.
Am. Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 343 S.E.2d 174 (1986)).
In Pearce, the supreme court had held that a violation of the predecessor of
section 58-63-15(1) “as a matter of law constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice in
violation of [section] 75-1.1.” Pearce, 316 N.C. at 470, 343 S.E.2d at 179. For additional
decisions that upgrade violations of section 58-63-15(1) or its predecessor, see FSI v.
Newson, No. COA13-222, 2013 WL 5947132, at *6 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2013)
(unpublished); Cullen v. Valley Forge Life Ins. Co., 161 N.C. App. 570, 579, 589 S.E.2d
423, 431 (2003); Kron Med. Corp. v. Collier Cobb & Assocs., Inc., 107 N.C. App. 331, 335,
341, 420 S.E.2d 192, 194, 197–98 (1992).
In contrast, the supreme court has applied a non-per-se analysis to another, more
commonly invoked, subsection of section 58-63-15. See infra notes 103–11 and
accompanying text (discussing a key decision under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(11)).
In the end, the court in Jefferson-Pilot found no section 75-1.1 violation, because
there was not actually a violation of section 58-63-15(1). 336 N.C. at 53, 442 S.E.2d at 318.
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section 75-1.1. Second, the court might be inferring a legislative
finding that whenever the predicate violation occurs, those acts satisfy
the usual conduct standards under section 75-1.1.50 The North
Carolina decisions to date, however, do not offer these or any other
explanations for semi-explicit upgrading.51
3. Selective Upgrading
Selective upgrading occurs when a predicate violation does not
meet the above conditions, but still triggers a per se violation of
section 75-1.1. Few North Carolina decisions have mentioned criteria
for selective upgrading. The few decisions that have done so,
however, have alluded to two tests.
First, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has implied that for a
predicate violation to be upgraded, the source of law for the predicate
violation must contain a detailed standard. In Walker v. Fleetwood
Homes of North Carolina, Inc.,52 the court stated that the predicate
statute in an earlier case53 “defined in detail unfair methods of
[settling] claims and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the
insurance industry.”54
Second, the supreme court has suggested that it will upgrade a
predicate violation when the goals of the source of law overlap with
the goals of section 75-1.1. For example, in Pearce v. American
Defender Life Insurance Co.,55 the court emphasized that the goal of

50. See Fistos, supra note 11, at 63–64 (offering a similar explanation for “per se
[violations] by description” under Florida’s section 5 analogue).
51. See cases cited supra note 49.
52. 362 N.C. 63, 653 S.E.2d 393 (2007).
53. See Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 529 S.E.2d 676, 683
(2000) (the earlier case); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(11) (2013) (the statute at
issue in Gray).
54. Walker, 362 N.C. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99 (emphasis added). As shown
below, the decision that the Walker court was discussing, Gray, did not actually involve a
per se violation. See infra notes 103–11 and accompanying text.
55. 316 N.C. 461, 343 S.E.2d 174 (1986).
It takes close reading to conclude that Pearce involves a per se violation. The
opinion does not use the term “per se.” It uses only the ambiguous phrase “as a matter of
law.” Id. at 470, 343 S.E.2d at 179; see also infra notes 172–85 and accompanying text
(explaining the ambiguity of this phrase). In addition, although the court held that “a
violation of N.C.G.S. § 58-54.4 as a matter of law constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade
practice in violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1,” it also discussed whether the defendant’s
statement “had the capacity or tendency to deceive.” Pearce, 316 N.C. at 470, 470–71, 343
S.E.2d at 179, 180. The discussion of “capacity or tendency to deceive” suggests that the
court was applying the usual conduct standard for deception under section 75-1.1—an
inquiry that a per se violation would make unnecessary. See, e.g., Winston Realty Co. v.
G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 98, 331 S.E.2d 677, 682 (1985) (stating this requirement for a
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the predicate violation at issue was “to define and prohibit unfair and
deceptive trade practices.”56
Because these two standards for selective upgrading are openended, it is hard to tell, based on these standards alone, whether a
new predicate violation will qualify for per se treatment. Section
III(B) of this Article analyzes this and other problems with selective
upgrading.57
4. The Special Rule for Violations of Regulations (and Perhaps for
Violations of Certain Statutes As Well)
Recently—and in some tension with the above decisions—the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has announced a categorical limit
on upgrading. The court’s decision illustrates some of the lingering
ambiguities in North Carolina upgrading standards.
In Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of North Carolina, Inc.,58 the
supreme court held that “violations of a licensure regulation . . . are
not per se unfair or deceptive trade practices.”59 In dicta, moreover,
the court appeared to extend this rule to “violation[s] of a regulatory
statute which governs business activities.”60

deception claim under section 75-1.1); see also supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text
(noting that a per se theory makes proof under the usual conduct standards unnecessary).
On a close reading, however, the Pearce opinion seems to be probing capacity or
tendency to deceive in connection with section 58-54.4, the predicate statute. See, e.g.,
Pearce, 316 N.C. at 470, 343 S.E.2d at 180 (“[I]n order for Mrs. Pearce to make out a claim
under section 58-54.4 as augmented by section 75-1.1, she must show only some—but not
all—of the same elements essential to making out a cause of action in fraud.”); id. at 472,
343 S.E.2d at 181 (concluding that “[t]he evidence supporting the unfair trade practice
claim by a violation of N.C.G.S. § 58-54.4 was sufficient” (emphasis added)); see also id. at
471–72, 343 S.E.2d at 180–81 (discussing a non-conduct-related aspect of section 75-1.1:
the requirement that the plaintiff rely on the defendant’s alleged misstatements).
56. Pearce, 316 N.C. at 469, 343 S.E.2d at 179.
In In re Fifth Third Bank, National Ass’n—Village of Penland Litigation, 217 N.C.
App. 199, 719 S.E.2d 171 (2011), the North Carolina Court of Appeals likewise hinted at a
“goal overlap” standard for upgrading. The court noted that the plaintiffs were arguing for
upgrading on the theory that “ ‘the banking laws’ are, in a general sense, intended to
further the public interest.” Id. at 209, 719 S.E.2d at 178 (appearing to quote plaintiffs’
brief); see also id. at 207, 719 S.E.2d at 176 (explaining that the court was evaluating a
possible per se violation of section 75-1.1).
In the end, however, the court held that the plaintiffs’ reference to “the banking
laws” was too vague to support any further analysis of upgrading. See id. at 209, 719 S.E.2d
at 178.
57. See infra notes 139–63 and accompanying text.
58. 362 N.C. 63, 653 S.E.2d 393 (2007).
59. Id. at 64, 653 S.E.2d at 395.
60. Id. at 70, 653 S.E.2d at 398.
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The trial court in Walker held that a mobile-home manufacturer
had violated North Carolina regulations on mobile-home sales and
service.61 Based on these violations, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals expressly recognized a per se violation of section 75-1.1.62
The decision of the court of appeals involved semi-explicit
upgrading.63 The regulations at issue specifically state that “unfair or
deceptive commercial acts or practices shall include” the acts in
question.64 The court of appeals highlighted this aspect of the
regulations when the court found a per se violation of section 75-1.1.65
Despite this linkage between the text of the regulations and
unfairness or deception, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
reversed the finding of a per se violation.66 To explain this conclusion,
the court drew a contrast between the regulations at issue in Walker
and the predicate statute involved in Gray v. North Carolina
Insurance Underwriting Ass’n,67 an earlier case in which the court had
upheld liability under section 75-1.1.68 The Walker court stated that
the predicate statute in Gray
defined in detail unfair methods of [settling] claims and unfair
and deceptive acts or practices in the insurance industry,
61. Id. at 69–70, 653 S.E.2d at 398 (quoting jury verdict and trial court’s judgment).
62. See Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 176 N.C. App. 668, 672, 627 S.E.2d
629, 632 (2006) (“We conclude that the trial court properly decided that defendant’s
violations of the Board’s regulation regarding [unfair and deceptive practices] constitute
factors sufficient to support a claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.”), aff’d in part and
modified in part, 362 N.C. 63, 653 S.E.2d 393 (2007).
The state supreme court, likewise, framed the issue as the presence or absence of
a per se violation. See, e.g., Walker, 362 N.C. at 64, 653 S.E.2d at 395 (stating, in
introduction to opinion, that the supreme court had decided that “violations of a licensure
regulation . . . are not per se unfair or deceptive”).
Interestingly, the judgment that the appellate courts reviewed in Walker had less
of a per se cast than the appellate opinions. The trial court, instead of relying on the mere
existence of the predicate violation, stated that the “acts [found by the jury] constitute, as
a matter of law, unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of [section 75-1.1].” Id. at
70, 653 S.E.2d at 398 (emphasis added) (quoting trial court’s judgment); cf. supra text
accompanying notes 36–37 (stating that the essence of a per se violation is treating the
existence of the predicate violation, rather than the underlying facts, as dispositive).
63. See supra text accompanying note 47 (defining semi-explicit upgrading).
64. 11 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 8.0907 (2014); see also Walker, 362 N.C. at 69–70, 653
S.E.2d at 398 (quoting the jury findings, which mirrored the wording of parts of this
regulation).
65. Walker, 176 N.C. App. at 672, 627 S.E.2d at 632.
66. Walker, 362 N.C. at 71–73, 653 S.E.2d at 399–400.
67. 352 N.C. 61, 529 S.E.2d 676 (2000).
68. Walker, 362 N.C. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99; see Gray, 352 N.C. at 71, 529
S.E.2d at 683. As shown below, Gray does not actually apply per se reasoning. See infra
notes 103–11 and accompanying text. Thus, Gray was an inapt decision for the supreme
court to use to draw a contrast between Walker and a per se case.
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thereby establishing the General Assembly’s intent to equate a
violation of that statute with the more general provision of
[section] 75-1.1. In contrast, the regulation at issue here was
promulgated by the Department of Insurance pursuant to
N.C.G.S. §§ 143-143.10 and 143-143.13. Because a violation of
these statutes would not constitute a [section 75-1.1 violation]
as a matter of law, we do not believe that a violation of a
licensing regulation based upon those statutes is necessarily a
[section 75-1.1 violation].69
The Walker court also noted several times that the regulations at
issue were connected with licensing.70 These licensing regulations,
however, do not seem different in kind from the insurance statutes at
issue in Gray. For example, state officials can use administrative
proceedings to enforce both the statutes at issue in Gray and the
regulations at issue in Walker.71
In any event, the holding in Walker is explicit: “[V]iolations of a
licensure regulation . . . are not per se unfair or deceptive trade
practices.”72
The Walker court also stated that “a violation of a regulatory
statute which governs business activities . . . does not automatically
result in an unfair or deceptive trade practice.”73 This reasoning was a
dictum74—and perhaps even a slip of the pen75—because the court
69. Walker, 362 N.C. at 71, 653 S.E.2d at 399; see also infra notes 143–44 and
accompanying text (analyzing this reasoning further).
70. See, e.g., Walker, 362 N.C. at 71, 653 S.E.2d at 399 (“[W]e decline to hold that a
violation of a licensing regulation is a [section 75-1.1 violation] as a matter of law.”); see
also id. at 68–69, 653 S.E.2d at 397–98 (describing the role of regulations in the licensing
scheme for mobile-home manufacturers).
71. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-63-20 to -50 (2013) (providing administrative
remedies for the statutes at issue in Gray), with id. § 143-143.13(a), (c) (providing
administrative remedies for the statutes and rules at issue in Walker).
72. 362 N.C. at 64, 653 S.E.2d at 395.
73. Id. at 70, 653 S.E.2d at 398 (emphasis added).
74. Because the Supreme Court of North Carolina analyzed Walker as a case based on
regulations, the court’s statements about the effects of statutory violations are dicta. See,
e.g., Wood v. N.C. State Univ., 147 N.C. App. 336, 340, 556 S.E.2d 38, 40 (2001) (treating
as dicta statements that involved a factual context different from the facts before the
court); Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953,
1074 (2005) (stating that “when a general proposition depends on a particular factual
predicate, that factual predicate must be true on the facts of a case, or the factual predicate
must be assumed to be true,” or the general proposition is a dictum (footnote omitted)).
75. The full passage that includes the phrases quoted above makes unclear whether
the court was referring to a statutory violation or a violation of regulations. See Walker,
362 N.C. at 70, 653 S.E.2d at 398 (“[A] violation of a regulatory statute which governs
business activities ‘may also be a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.’ While such a
regulatory violation may offend N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, the violation does not automatically
result in an unfair or deceptive trade practice under that statute.” (emphasis added and
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stated repeatedly that violations of licensing regulations were at
issue.76
The court’s rejection of regulatory statutes as predicate statutes
is also surprising on the merits. The court did not define the
disfavored category of regulatory statutes.77 Further, it is unclear why
the court disfavored the two statutes that it cited. One of those
statutes, after all, allows an agency to deny, suspend, or revoke a
license for “[u]sing unfair methods of competition or committing
unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”78
As noted above, Walker involved semi-explicit upgrading.79 The
court’s rejection of upgrading of regulatory violations, however, will
probably apply with even greater force in cases of selective
upgrading. By definition, the predicate regulations in selectiveupgrading cases, unlike the regulations at issue in Walker, would
make no reference to unfairness or deception.80
No decision since Walker has added any substance, scope, or
limits to the decision. For example, no decision has elaborated on the
court’s discussion of regulatory statutes.81

deleted) (citation omitted) (quoting Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Servs., Inc.,
108 N.C. App. 169, 172, 423 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1992))).
76. See id. at 64, 66, 68, 70, 71, 653 S.E.2d at 395, 396, 397, 398, 399.
The lower courts in Walker, however, put greater emphasis on the statutory
violations than the supreme court did. The court of appeals held that the “defendant
engaged in acts which are direct violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-143.13, which specifies
grounds for denying, suspending, or revoking licenses of or imposing civil penalties on
members of the manufactured housing industry.” Walker, 176 N.C. App. at 671, 627 S.E.2d
at 632. The trial court in Walker, likewise, implied that the manufacturer had violated the
underlying statute. The court stated: “North Carolina General Statute § 143-143.13(a)(7)
sets out using unfair and deceptive acts or practices as defined in 11 NCAC 8.0907 as a
ground for denying, suspending or revoking the license of a manufacturer of manufactured
housing.” Walker, 362 N.C. at 69–70, 653 S.E.2d at 398 (quoting trial court’s judgment).
77. See Walker, 362 N.C. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99. The court’s statements about
regulatory statutes, moreover, silently departed from earlier decisions. For example, in
Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985), the court
specifically rejected the argument that “a Chapter 75 violation may not be based on the
jury’s finding that [a] defendant violated [a statute that is] regulatory in nature.” Id. at 97,
331 S.E.2d at 681; see also infra notes 112–20 and accompanying text (discussing Winston
Realty).
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-143.13(a)(7) (2013).
79. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
80. See 11 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 8.0907 (2014) (the regulations at issue in Walker);
supra notes 47–56 and accompanying text (defining semi-explicit upgrading and selective
upgrading).
81. Cf. Taylor v. United States, No. 7:11-CV-268-FL, 2014 WL 1096298, at *8
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 19, 2014) (citing this aspect of Walker with a “cf.” signal and deciding that
an administrator of a military health insurance program did not violate section 75-1.1 by
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Section III(B) below further discusses the ambiguities in Walker
and the distinctions applied in the decision.82
B.

The Near Relatives of Per Se Violations

In addition to the per se theories discussed above, North
Carolina courts have also created several near relatives of per se
violations. These theories arise when courts split the difference
between recognizing a per se violation of section 75-1.1 and deciding
that a predicate violation has no effect on the analysis under section
75-1.1.
The near relatives fall into four categories:
•

First, courts sometimes state that a predicate violation is not
a per se violation, but is “evidence of” or “relevant to” a
section 75-1.1 violation.83

•

Second, courts occasionally state that a predicate violation
provides an example of conduct that violates the usual
conduct standard under section 75-1.1.84

•

Third, courts often state that a predicate violation “may be”
a violation of section 75-1.1.85 Although this phrase could

committing a minor violation of regulations), appeal docketed, No. 14-1476 (4th Cir. May
16, 2014).
A number of courts have made decisions within the ambit of Walker without
addressing Walker. See, e.g., In re Hinson, 481 B.R. 364, 377 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012)
(holding, on a non-per-se basis and without citing Walker, that violations of federal agency
pronouncements that implement the Home Affordable Modification Program “can
constitute the type of unfair or unscrupulous behavior which N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 seeks to
prevent”); Weber Hodges & Godwin Commercial Real Estate Servs., LLC v. Hartley, No.
COA13-207, 2013 WL 4716368, at *4–5 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished)
(holding, without citing Walker, that violations of a trade association’s self-regulatory rules
were not a per se violation of section 75-1.1); Bartlett Milling Co. v. Walnut Grove
Auction & Realty Co., 192 N.C. App. 74, 82–83, 665 S.E.2d 478, 486 (2008) (holding,
without citing Walker, that the plaintiffs did not preserve an argument that violations of
auctioneer-licensing statutes were a per se violation of section 75-1.1).
82. See infra notes 143–53 and accompanying text.
83. E.g., Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 71, 653 S.E.2d 393,
399 (2007); see infra notes 97–102 and accompanying text.
84. E.g., Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 529 S.E.2d 676, 683
(2000); see infra notes 103–11 and accompanying text.
85. E.g., Stanley v. Moore, 339 N.C. 717, 724, 454 S.E.2d 225, 229 (1995); Drouillard v.
Keister Williams Newspaper Servs., Inc., 108 N.C. App. 169, 172, 423 S.E.2d 324, 326
(1992); Keister v. Nat’l Council of the Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of the U.S., No. 12
CVS 1137, 2013 WL 3864583, at *3 (N.C. Bus. Ct. July 18, 2013).
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suggest that a predicate violation might be a per se violation
of section 75-1.1, courts more often use the phrase to reject
the conclusion that the existence of a predicate violation bars
a claim under section 75-1.1.86
•

Finally, a few decisions contain what one might call illusory
per se reasoning. They announce that a predicate violation
states a violation of section 75-1.1 if the plaintiff also satisfies
the usual conduct standard for a section 75-1.1 claim.87

Having these near-relative theories on the books alongside per se
violations, with no explanation of the role of each, is a recipe for
confusion. Section III(A) below analyzes the near-relative theories
and the problems they create.
III. THE KEY PROBLEMS WITH PER SE THEORIES UNDER SECTION
75-1.1
Part II of this Article has described the existing standards for per
se violations and their near relatives. The following part of the Article
explains three sets of problems with these standards.
The first problem is the very existence of the near relatives.
Under current law, some predicate violations generate per se
violations of section 75-1.1, but other predicate violations produce
weaker effects. The nature of these weaker effects is unclear. Even
less clear is why courts have announced these effects, as opposed to
per se violations.88
The second set of problems involves the current standards for
selective upgrading. These standards are ambiguous in several
respects.89 Moreover, even when courts have announced standards in
clear language, the standards break down under close scrutiny.90
The third set of problems stems from the ambiguity of a key
phrase used in this area: “as a matter of law.” This phrase has allowed
courts to blur the line between per se theories and their near

86. See infra notes 112–28 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Drouillard, 108 N.C. App. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326; see infra notes 129–
36 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 94–138 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 139–53 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 154–63 and accompanying text.
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relatives.91 It has also caused non-per-se decisions to be
misunderstood, in later cases, as per se decisions.92
The following subsections discuss these three sets of problems in
turn.
A. The Problems of the Near Relatives
When North Carolina courts have considered per se violations of
section 75-1.1, they have often made compromise decisions. They
have not been willing to say that a predicate violation is a per se
violation of section 75-1.1 (and thus automatically generates treble
damages under section 75-16).93 However, they have also been
unwilling to say the opposite—that a predicate violation makes no
difference to the analysis under section 75-1.1.
Instead, the courts have often split the difference between these
two outcomes. They have used a variety of phrases to say that a
predicate violation does not automatically establish a section 75-1.1
violation, but is not a matter of indifference either. These theories,
discussed below, are the near relatives of per se violations.
The near relatives are a problem, not a solution. Studying the
near relatives in the context of decided cases shows their essential
flaws: courts have not explained what these variations on a per se
theory really mean, when each variation applies, or why any of the
variations even exist. This lack of explanation leaves the effect of new
predicate violations unclear.
1. “Relevant to” or “Evidence of”
94

In Walker, the Supreme Court of North Carolina mentioned
two near-relative theories. In doing so, the court illustrated some of
the problems with these theories.
Walker held that a violation of a licensing regulation is not a per
se violation of section 75-1.1.95 The court, however, did not hold that a
violation of a licensing regulation adds nothing to a section 75-1.1

91. See infra notes 164–71 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 172–85 and accompanying text.
93. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2013); Bhatti v. Buckland, 328 N.C. 240, 243, 400
S.E.2d 440, 442 (1991) (“If a violation of Chapter 75 is found, treble damages must be
awarded.”).
94. Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 653 S.E.2d 393 (2007); see
also supra notes 58–80 and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of a per se
violation in Walker).
95. Walker, 362 N.C. at 64, 70, 653 S.E.2d at 395, 398; see supra notes 58–72 and
accompanying text.
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claim.96 On the contrary, the court stated twice that a violation of a
licensing regulation adds something:
•

“[A] regulatory licensure violation may be evidence of a
[section 75-1.1 violation]. Thus, even though defendant’s
violations of [the regulations at issue] are not unfair or
deceptive trade practices per se, those violations are
potentially relevant to any claim that defendant violated
[section] 75-1.1.”97

•

Jury findings that show violations of a licensing regulation
“can be evidence of unfair or deceptive practices and, in
combination with other facts, might be sufficient to prove a
[section 75-1.1] claim.”98

In these passages, the supreme court stated that a violation of a
licensing regulation falls short of a per se violation of section 75-1.1,
but still promotes a section 75-1.1 violation.99 The court, however, did
not say how much (or how little) help a regulatory violation would
give a plaintiff. Likewise, the court did not explain the respective
roles of a regulatory violation and other facts when a court analyzes a
section 75-1.1 claim. In the seven years since Walker, no other opinion
has taken up these questions.100
Thus, the case law leaves unclear how a predicate violation that
does not support a per se violation of section 75-1.1 affects a court’s
non-per-se analysis. In particular, the case law offers no answer to the
pivotal question: Why would a predicate violation fall short of a per
se violation, but still be important enough to turn facts that do not
violate section 75-1.1 into facts that do?
Given the problems that appellate courts have had in applying
per se violations,101 there is little reason to believe that busy trial
96. See Walker, 362 N.C. at 71, 653 S.E.2d at 399.
97. Id. (emphasis added; stylistic italics deleted).
98. Id. at 72, 653 S.E.2d at 400 (emphasis added).
99. See id. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99.
100. The only known use of Walker’s non-per-se reasoning appears in an unpublished
decision of the Fourth Circuit. In Country Vintner of North Carolina, LLC v. E & J Gallo
Winery, Inc., 461 F. App’x 302 (4th Cir. 2012), the court observed that a “violation of . . . a
regulatory statute may be evidence of an unfair or deceptive trade practice, even if it is not
a per se violation of [section 75-1.1].” Id. at 305 (citing Walker, 362 N.C. at 70–71, 653
S.E.2d at 398–99). The court, however, did not apply this principle, because it found no
violation of the regulatory statute in question. Id.
101. See infra notes 139–63 and accompanying text.
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courts can answer the above questions with any rigor or
consistency.102
2. “Examples” of a Violation of the Usual Conduct Standard
In other opinions, courts likewise shy away from a per se theory,
but hold that a predicate violation satisfies the usual conduct standard
under section 75-1.1.103
The most important decision of this type is Gray v. North
Carolina Insurance Underwriting Ass’n.104 The plaintiffs in Gray won
in the trial court by arguing that a violation of a North Carolina
statute on the handling of insurance claims105 was a per se violation of
section 75-1.1.106 Trouble arose, however, when the court of appeals
decided that a key element of this predicate violation was missing.107
In the state supreme court, the parties debated whether a predicate

102. The history of Walker on remand illustrates the low likelihood that trial courts can
apply a “less than per se” analysis rigorously. On remand, the trial court held that the
same predicate violations that the supreme court had rejected as per se violations still
violated section 75-1.1—indeed, violated it in seven ways. Although the trial court had
earlier relied on a per se theory, it held on remand that the defendant’s violations of the
mobile-home statutes and regulations were “contrary to public policy and substantially
injurious to the plaintiffs, consumers,” “unfair and unscrupulous,” acts that “amounted to
an inequitable assertion of power by the defendant over the plaintiffs, consumers,”
“deceptive,” “substantially aggravated by the repeated failures to respond to consumer
complaints and the repeated failures to properly repair the known defects in the home,”
acts that had “a substantial impact on the market place of manufactured housing,” and
“unethical, unscrupulous, oppressive, and . . . substantially injurious to consumers.”
Amended Judgment concls. of law 6–12, Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., No. 02
CVS 569 (Craven Cnty., N.C. Super. Ct. July 1, 2008).
103. See, e.g., Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 73, 529 S.E.2d 676,
683, 684 (2000).
104. Id.
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(11) (2013).
106. Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 132 N.C. App. 63, 65, 510 S.E.2d 396, 398
(1999) (reciting this history), rev’d, 352 N.C. at 61, 529 S.E.2d at 676; Plaintiff-Appellant’s
Brief at 12, Gray, 352 N.C. 61, 529 S.E.2d 676 (No. 84PA99).
107. See Gray, 132 N.C. App. at 68–69, 510 S.E.2d at 400 (“[W]e find that there was
insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that any of the acts of
defendant were done with such frequency as to indicate a ‘general business practice.’ ”);
see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(11) (requiring, for a violation, that an insurer commit
specified bad acts “with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice”).
The plaintiffs faced an additional hurdle as well: the claims-handling statute,
section 58-63-15(11), expressly disclaimed a private right of action. See id. (“[N]o violation
of this subsection shall of itself create any cause of action in favor of any person other than
the Commissioner [of Insurance].”). In earlier cases, however, the state courts had decided
that for another subsection of section 58-63-15, section 75-1.1 creates the otherwise
missing right of action. See, e.g., Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 336 N.C. 49, 53,
442 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1994); Pearce v. Am. Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 470, 343
S.E.2d 174, 179–80 (1986).
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violation that was missing a key element could nonetheless establish a
per se violation of section 75-1.1.108
The supreme court did not resolve this debate. Instead of finding
a per se violation of section 75-1.1, the court found a violation
“separate from and not based upon a violation of” the predicate
statute.109 The court held that conduct that violates the predicate
statute “embodies the broader standards of [section] 75-1.1 because
such conduct is inherently unfair, unscrupulous, immoral, and
injurious to consumers. Thus, such conduct . . . constitutes a violation
of [section] 75-1.1, as a matter of law.”110
When the court applied these broader standards, it stated that it
“agree[d] with the practice of looking to [the predicate statute] for
examples of conduct to support a finding of unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.”111 The court, however, did not explain how a statute might
state examples of violations of section 75-1.1, yet fail to establish a per
se violation of that statute. Although the word “examples” suggests
that some violations of the predicate statute in Gray fall short of
violating section 75-1.1, the opinion does not explain when such a
shortfall could occur.
3. Extending a Conclusion That a Section 75-1.1 Claim Is Not Barred
In several of the early cases that contributed to the per se theory,
the North Carolina courts did not apply upgrading at all. Instead, the
courts simply rejected arguments that because a more specific statute
covered the acts at issue, section 75-1.1 could not apply. In several of
these “claim not barred” cases, the courts went on to uphold non-perse liability under section 75-1.1. The decisions, however, expressed
both of these conclusions in ambiguous language. These ambiguities
have caused the early opinions to be misunderstood in later cases.

108. See Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief at 17, Gray, 352 N.C. 61, 529 S.E.2d 676 (No.
84PA99); Defendant-Appellee’s New Brief at 11, Gray, 352 N.C. 61, 529 S.E.2d 676 (No.
84PA99).
109. Gray, 352 N.C. at 67, 529 S.E.2d at 680 (“Plaintiffs contend that defendant
violated [the claims-handling statute] constituting a violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 and that
defendant violated N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 separate from and not based upon a violation of [the
claims-handling statute]. We agree with plaintiffs’ latter contention.”). Notably, the trial
court had rejected this non-per-se theory, and the court of appeals had affirmed that
ruling. See Gray, 132 N.C. App. at 73, 510 S.E.2d at 402–03.
110. Gray, 352 N.C. at 71, 529 S.E.2d at 683. As shown below, this use of “as a matter
of law” has led later courts to misread Gray as a per se case. See infra notes 172–85 and
accompanying text.
111. Gray, 352 N.C. at 71, 529 S.E.2d at 683 (emphasis added).
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An often-cited decision of this type is Winston Realty Co. v.
G.H.G., Inc.112 An employee-placement firm falsely told a client that
it had investigated the background of a new bookkeeper.113 When the
bookkeeper embezzled from the client, the client sued the placement
firm.114 The client alleged violations of a North Carolina statute that
regulates placement firms,115 as well as section 75-1.1.
The placement firm argued that “a Chapter 75 violation may not
be based on the jury’s finding that defendant violated the [placementfirm statute], because these provisions are regulatory in nature.”116
The Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected this argument. The
court stated: “Although the authority to enforce the [placement-firm
statute] rests with the Commissioner of Labor, it is obvious that the
list of proscribed acts found in [that statute was] designed to protect
the consuming public.”117 This point led the court to conclude that a
violation of the placement-firm statute “as a matter of law constitutes
an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of [section 751.1].”118
Although the phrase “as a matter of law” might imply that the
court was recognizing a per se violation,119 the opinion as a whole
contradicts that reading. The court never used the phrase “per se.”
More importantly, it affirmed a judgment under section 75-1.1 only
after reviewing the evidence and applying the usual conduct standard
112. 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985); see, e.g., Gray, 352 N.C. at 70, 529 S.E.2d at
682 (citing Winston Realty, 341 N.C. at 97, 331 S.E.2d at 681); Stanley v. Moore, 339 N.C.
717, 723, 454 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1995) (citing generally Winston Realty); Ellis v. N. Star Co.,
326 N.C. 219, 225, 388 S.E.2d 127, 131 (1990) (same); Pearce, 316 N.C. at 469–70, 343
S.E.2d at 179–80 (discussing Winston Realty); In re Fifth Third Bank, Nat’l Ass’n—Vill. of
Penland Litig., 216 N.C. App. 482, 490, 716 S.E.2d 850, 856 (2011) (quoting Winston
Realty Co. v. G.H.G. Inc., 70 N.C. App. 374, 380–81, 320 S.E.2d 286, 290 (1984), aff’d, 314
N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985)); Media Network, Inc. v. Long Haymes Carr, Inc., 197 N.C.
App. 433, 452–53, 678 S.E.2d 671, 684 (2009) (discussing Winston Realty).
113. Winston Realty, 314 N.C. at 93, 331 S.E.2d at 679.
114. See id.
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-47.6(2), (9) (2013).
116. Winston Realty, 314 N.C. at 97, 331 S.E.2d at 681. The supreme court also noted
that the regulatory statute contained no private right of action, but the court did not
attribute that point to an argument by the defendant. See id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. In fact, the phrase “as a matter of law” in section 75-1.1 opinions usually states
much less than a per se violation. It usually refers to the rule that courts, not juries, decide
whether a fact pattern violates the conduct standard under section 75-1.1. See, e.g., Hardy
v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975) (the seminal case on this rule); see
also supra note 42 (discussing the two meanings of “as a matter of law” in Hardy); infra
notes 164–85 and accompanying text (discussing the problems caused by the ambiguity of
“as a matter of law” in potential per se cases under section 75-1.1).
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under the statute.120 A per se analysis would have made this
evaluation of the evidence unnecessary.
In sum, Winston Realty, one of the most frequently cited
precedents in per se cases, is not itself a per se decision. It simply
rejects arguments that when other statutes and regulations apply,
section 75-1.1 cannot.
Other decisions follow a similar pattern. They reject defendants’
arguments, but they stop well short of upgrading predicate violations
to per se violations of section 75-1.1.121 Several of these decisions say,
for example, that a given predicate violation “may be” a violation of
section 75-1.1.122
120. See Winston Realty, 314 N.C. at 97–98, 331 S.E.2d at 681–82; see also id. at 98, 331
S.E.2d at 682 (“A practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as
when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially
injurious to consumers. [A] practice is deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to
deceive; proof of actual deception is not required.” (citations omitted) (quoting Marshall
v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981))).
121. See, e.g., Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 529 S.E.2d 676,
683 (2000) (“Although N.C.G.S. § 58-63-15(11) does regulate settlement claims in the
insurance industry, insurance companies are not immune to the general principles and
provisions of [section] 75-1.1.”); Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Long, 113 N.C. App. 187, 196, 439
S.E.2d 599, 604 (1993) (“[U]nfair and deceptive acts in the insurance area are not
regulated exclusively by [section] 58-63 . . . but are also actionable under [section] 751.1.”); Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Servs., Inc., 108 N.C. App. 169, 172, 423
S.E.2d 324, 326 (1992) (“[The counterclaim defendants] contend that because the
Legislature did not specifically provide that any violation of [the North Carolina Trade
Secrets Protection Act] would constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, such a result was not intended. We disagree. . . . This Court has
repeatedly held that the violation of regulatory statutes which govern business activities
may also be a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 . . . .” (emphasis added)); Ellis v. SmithBroadhurst, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 180, 183, 268 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1980) (rejecting arguments
similar to the ones that were rejected in Winston Realty, then stating: “We hold, therefore,
that G.S. 75-1.1 provides a remedy for unfair trade practices in the insurance industry”
(emphasis added)). But see Brinkman v. Barrett Kays & Assocs., P.A., 155 N.C. App. 738,
745, 575 S.E.2d 40, 45 (2003) (“We conclude that plaintiffs may not utilize Chapter 75 to
create a private right of action where none existed and thereby circumvent the intent of
the legislature to have the honesty requirement in the enforcement section of the Clean
Water Act enforced as provided for in that section.”); cf. Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N.
Va., 367 N.C. 81, 91–92, 747 S.E.2d 220, 228–29 (2013) (rejecting section 75-1.1 claim for
charging “excessive” prices, in part because North Carolina’s price-gouging statute, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75-38, which contains an explicit cross-reference to section 75-1.1, did not
apply).
122. E.g., Stanley v. Moore, 339 N.C. 717, 724, 454 S.E.2d 225, 229 (1995) (rejecting
defendants’ arguments, then stating that “it is clear that conduct which violates the
Ejectment of Residential Tenants Act may also constitute a violation of the Unfair and
Deceptive Practices Act”); Drouillard, 108 N.C. App. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326 (rejecting
defendants’ arguments, then holding that a violation of the North Carolina Trade Secrets
Protection Act “may also be a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1”); see also United
Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 665, 370 S.E.2d 375, 389 (1988) (rejecting similar
arguments, then refusing to limit section 75-1.1 to the fact patterns in earlier cases).
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In later decisions, however, these limited conclusions have been
extended beyond their history as rejections of defendants’ arguments.
For example, in Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC,123 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals cited Winston Realty for the
following proposition: “North Carolina appellate courts have held
that violations of certain regulatory statutes are per se violations of
[section] 75-1.1.”124
Courts have likewise misinterpreted the “may be” decisions. In
Walker, the Supreme Court of North Carolina emphasized that just
because a predicate violation may violate section 75-1.1, that
possibility does not necessarily establish a per se violation.125 At least
two courts, however, have treated the decision that Walker cited for
this point, Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Services, Inc.,126
as a basis for finding a per se violation.127
These problems arose because in Winston Realty, Drouillard, and
similar decisions, the courts did not clarify which of three possible
holdings they were announcing:
•

The mere fact that a predicate statute or regulation covers
certain activities does not bar section 75-1.1 from applying to
those activities.

This “may be” reasoning has spread to decisions that do not focus on defendants’
arguments. See, e.g., Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 70, 653 S.E.2d
393, 398 (2007) (“While [a violation of a regulatory statute] may offend N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1,
the violation does not automatically result in an unfair or deceptive trade practice under
that statute.”); In re Fifth Third Bank, Nat’l Ass’n—Vill. of Penland Litig., 217 N.C. App.
199, 207, 719 S.E.2d 171, 176 (2011) (quoting same sentence from Walker, then stating:
“For that reason, a violation of a consumer protection statute may, in some instances,
constitute a per se violation of [section 75-1.1]”); Ausley v. Bishop, 133 N.C. App. 210, 216,
515 S.E.2d 72, 77 (1999) (“[S]lander per se may constitute a violation of section 75-1.1.”).
123. 199 N.C. App. 163, 681 S.E.2d 448 (2009).
124. Id. at 170, 681 S.E.2d at 454. For the same point, the court also cited Gray, another
non-per-se decision. See supra notes 104–11 and accompanying text (explaining Gray); see
also infra notes 172–78 (discussing other decisions that misinterpret Gray).
125. Walker, 362 N.C. at 70, 653 S.E.2d at 398.
126. 108 N.C. App. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326 (rejecting defendants’ arguments, then
holding that a violation of the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act “may also be a
violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1”); see also infra notes 129–36 and accompanying text
(further discussing Drouillard and its problems).
127. See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Darkprint Imaging, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d
465, 487 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (citing Drouillard, 108 N.C. App. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326, and
then concluding that trade secret misappropriation, with no additional substantive
showing, violated section 75-1.1); Kewaunee Sci. Corp. v. Pegram, 130 N.C. App. 576, 581,
502 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1998) (citing Drouillard, 108 N.C. App. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326, and
then concluding, with no additional substantive showing, that a violation of a criminal
statute on commercial bribery “should also be considered a violation of G.S. 75-1.1”).
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•

A predicate violation states a per se violation of section 751.1—that is, every instance of that predicate violation
satisfies the conduct standard under section 75-1.1.

•

The predicate violation falls short of a per se violation of
section 75-1.1, but nonetheless promotes a non-per-se
violation of section 75-1.1.

Phrases like “may be” could state any one of these propositions.
Winston Realty and Drouillard, however, stand only for the first
proposition—a rejection of defendants’ arguments.128
As the above decisions illustrate, conclusions like “may be” are
so elastic that they cause confusion in later cases.
4. A Per Se Violation if There Is a Non-Per-Se Violation
Finally, North Carolina courts have issued what one might call
illusory per se decisions. An illusory per se decision states that a
predicate violation is a “per se” violation of section 75-1.1, but only if
a conflicting condition is satisfied: that the defendant’s acts meet the
usual conduct standard under section 75-1.1.
The leading decision of this type is Drouillard.129 In that case, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals stated that if a violation of North
Carolina’s “Trade Secrets Protection Act satisfies [the usual] three
prong test [under section 75-1.1], it would be a violation of [section]
75-1.1.”130
The court in Noble131 relied on similar reasoning. The court
quoted Drouillard, then stated: “Plaintiffs have failed to allege
actions which constitute the first element of a claim under [section 751.1]: ‘an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of
competition[.]’ Thus, the alleged violation of the statutes and
regulations cited by Plaintiffs does not constitute a violation of

128. See supra notes 112–20, 125 and accompanying text.
129. 108 N.C. App. at 169, 423 S.E.2d at 324.
130. Id. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326 (emphasis added); accord Awarepoint Corp. v. Noel,
No. 11 CVS 19136, 2012 WL 2603309, ¶ 23 (N.C. Bus. Ct. May 14, 2012) (containing
similar reasoning).
131. Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 681 S.E.2d 448
(2009).
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[section 75-1.1].”132 This reasoning is a contradiction in terms. If a
plaintiff has to satisfy the usual conduct standard under section 75-1.1
in any event,133 what is the relevance of a predicate violation?134
Unsurprisingly, the illusory per se decisions have been
interpreted inconsistently in later cases. Some courts have taken
Drouillard literally and have required plaintiffs to make the same
showing that they would have to make in the absence of a predicate
violation.135 Other courts, however, have upgraded predicate
violations to per se violations of section 75-1.1, citing Drouillard—an
illusory per se decision—as authority for this upgrading.136 In short,
illusory per se reasoning has produced only confusion.
***
As the above subsections suggest, the near relatives of per se
violations are little more than coping mechanisms. They relieve courts
from choosing between two absolute outcomes: (1) deciding that a
predicate violation does nothing to promote a section 75-1.1 violation
or (2) deciding that it automatically amounts to a section 75-1.1
violation.
132. Id. at 171, 681 S.E.2d at 455 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Furr v. Fonville Morisey Realty, Inc., 130 N.C. App. 541, 551, 503 S.E.2d 401, 408
(1998)).
133. See Drouillard, 108 N.C. App. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326.
134. Proving the elements of a predicate violation, after all, will often present daunting
challenges of its own. See, e.g., AECOM Tech. Corp. v. Keating, No. 11 CVS 9225, 2012
WL 370296, at *3–4 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Feb. 6, 2012) (upholding section 75-1.1 claim but
rejecting plaintiffs’ claim for misappropriation of trade secrets).
135. See, e.g., Awarepoint, 2012 WL 2603309, ¶¶ 23–24 (citing Drouillard, 108 N.C.
App. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326, but then analyzing the facts of Awarepoint in light of nonper-se case law); Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Head & Engquist Equip., L.L.C., No. 00 CVS
10358, 2003 WL 21017456, at *50–54 (N.C. Bus. Ct. May 2, 2003) (conducting similar, but
more extensive, analysis), aff’d, 174 N.C. App. 49, 620 S.E.2d 222 (2005).
136. See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Darkprint Imaging, Inc., 240 F. Supp.
2d 465, 487 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (“The North Carolina Court of Appeals has held that trade
secret misappropriation can constitute a violation of § 75-1.1 if it also affects commerce
and is the proximate cause of Static Control’s actual injury. See [Drouillard]. . . . Static
Control has thus demonstrated a cause of action for unfair or deceptive trade practices.”);
Kewaunee Sci. Corp. v. Pegram, 130 N.C. App. 576, 581, 503 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1998) (citing
Drouillard, 108 N.C. App. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326, then concluding that a violation of a
criminal bribery statute “should also be considered a violation of G.S. 75-1.1 as an unfair
and deceptive trade practice”); Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Head & Engquist Equip., L.L.C.,
No. 00 CVS 10358, 2002 WL 31002955, at *16–17 (N.C. Bus. Ct. July 10, 2002) (citing
generally Drouillard, then reasoning that because a claim under North Carolina Trade
Secrets Protection Act had survived summary judgment, a section 75-1.1 claim necessarily
survived summary judgment as well), aff’d on other grounds, 174 N.C. App. 49, 620 S.E.2d
222 (2005).
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This relief comes at a steep price. Opinions that apply the near
relatives offer no standards to help a court decide whether the next
predicate violation—or, for that matter, the same predicate
violation—generates liability under section 75-1.1. This lack of
standards makes the outcome of later cases unpredictable to lawyers
and clients.137 Unpredictability makes lawsuits under section 75-1.1
last longer and arise more often.138
B.

Unclear Standards for Selective Upgrading

Problems with the relationship between predicate violations and
section 75-1.1 are not limited to the near-relative theories described
above. Similar problems arise when courts consider selective
upgrading.139 Only a few North Carolina decisions announce tests to
govern this important form of upgrading. As shown below, these tests
are ambiguous. Even the clearly defined aspects of these tests,
moreover, draw questionable distinctions.
1. Ambiguous Standards
As noted above, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has
mentioned two possible circumstances in which it will upgrade a
predicate violation to a per se violation of section 75-1.1.140 First, the
court has implied that upgrading will occur when a predicate violation
states a detailed conduct standard.141 Second, the court has upgraded
predicate violations whose goals overlap with the goals of section 751.1.142

137. See, e.g., Neil W. Averitt, The Elements of a Policy Statement on Section 5,
ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 15 (Oct. 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/publishing/antitrust_source/oct13_averitt_10_29f.authcheckdam.pdf
(discussing
the
importance of predictable standards under section 5 of the FTC Act); supra note 21 and
accompanying text (explaining the relationship between section 5 and section 75-1.1).
138. See supra notes 31, 33–34 and accompanying text (discussing the high volume of
litigation under section 75-1.1); see also Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2035–36
(discussing how unpredictable standards affect litigation strategy in section 75-1.1 cases).
139. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (defining and discussing selective
upgrading).
140. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 71, 653 S.E.2d
393, 399 (2007) (noting that a predicate statute that had supported upgrading in an earlier
case “defined in detail unfair methods of [settling] claims and unfair and deceptive acts or
practices in the insurance industry”).
142. See, e.g., Pearce v. Am. Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 469, 343 S.E.2d 174,
179 (1986) (upgrading a predicate violation because its goal “is to define and prohibit
unfair and deceptive trade practices”); see also In re Fifth Third Bank, Nat’l Ass’n—Vill.
of Penland Litig., 217 N.C. App. 199, 209, 719 S.E.2d 171, 178 (2011) (implying that
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These implied standards for upgrading raise unanswered
questions. For example, does a predicate violation need to satisfy only
one, or both, of the above tests? Recent decisions use ambiguous
language on this point.
In Walker,143 for instance, the supreme court noted that the
statute at issue in Gray “defined in detail unfair methods of [settling]
claims and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the insurance
industry, thereby establishing the General Assembly’s intent to
equate a violation of that statute with the more general provision of
[section] 75-1.1.”144 Which feature established the General
Assembly’s intent—the detailed definition, the focus of the predicate
statute on unfair and deceptive acts, or both? The unclear antecedent
of the word “thereby” in Walker leaves this question unanswered.
Likewise, in Noble,145 the court of appeals stated that a per se
violation of section 75-1.1 arises when a predicate statute “specifically
defines . . . conduct which is unfair or deceptive within the meaning of
[section] 75-1.1.”146 This phrase, too, is ambiguous on whether a
specific definition of prohibited conduct in a predicate statute is
sufficient, or merely necessary.
To try to resolve these ambiguities, one can analyze the predicate
statutes discussed in these opinions. Here, however, this technique
does not add much clarity.
The court in Walker stated, for example, that a violation of the
manufactured-home statutes that underlie the regulations at issue
“would not constitute a [section 75-1.1 violation] as a matter of
law.”147 Under the standards discussed above, this conclusion is
surprising. The manufactured-home statutes allow a regulatory

violations of banking laws could support a per se violation of section 75-1.1 because the
banking laws are “intended to further the public interest”).
143. 362 N.C. at 71, 653 S.E.2d at 399.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 681 S.E.2d 448
(2009).
146. Id. at 170, 681 S.E.2d at 454 (emphasis added). The court applied the same
standard when it rejected upgrading because the predicate statutes at issue “do not
specifically define and proscribe unfair or deceptive conduct within the meaning of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.” Id. at 171, 681 S.E.2d at 455; cf. Trimark Foodcraft, Inc. v. Leger, No.
COA13-923, 2014 WL 2781761, at *3–4 (N.C. Ct. App. June 17, 2014) (unpublished)
(opining that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-24 meets this standard, but holding that the
defendant’s conduct did not violate section 44A-24).
147. Walker, 362 N.C. at 71, 653 S.E.2d at 399.
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agency to issue sanctions when a dealer “commit[s] unfair or
deceptive acts or practices.”148
The discussion of predicate statutes in Noble is equally
surprising. As one example of a per se violation, the Noble court cited
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-47.6, the statute at issue in Winston Realty.149
That statute states only that “[a] private personnel service shall not
engage in” twelve listed acts.150 The listed acts do not expressly
include unfair or deceptive conduct.151
According to Walker and Noble, then, a predicate statute that
penalizes unfair or deceptive acts—in those terms—in the sale of a
consumer product does not support a per se violation of section 751.1, but a predicate statute that involves a business service, and that
does not literally refer to unfair or deceptive acts, does support a per
se violation. These counterintuitive conclusions offer little guidance
to a court that must decide whether a different predicate violation
states a per se violation of section 75-1.1.
The situation does not improve if one focuses on the language in
Walker and Noble that mentions the degree of specificity or detail in
predicate statutes.152 Neither of those decisions, nor any later one,
announces any standards for the level of specificity required. Indeed,
the courts in Walker and Noble did not analyze the level of specificity
of the predicate statutes they cited.153
Finally, identifying the courts’ conclusions on these issues
requires a reader to draw inferences from the statutes cited in the
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-143.13(a)(7) (2013). These statutes, moreover, were
enacted for the express purpose of protecting consumers. See id. § 143-143.8 (noting the
“legislative intent to promote the general welfare and safety of manufactured home
residents in North Carolina”). Given the overt focus of these statutes on consumer
protection, one can disagree with a leading commentator’s statement that “the
manufactured housing regulations at issue in Walker were not based upon statutes which
in and of themselves described violations of § 75-1.1.” ALLEN, supra note 1, § 9.04, at 9-34
to -36; see also id. (“[T]he result [in Walker] could be different if the regulation(s) at
issue in a case have been promulgated pursuant to statutory authority that adequately
proscribes unfair or deceptive practices by licensees.”).
149. Noble, 199 N.C. App. at 170 n.3, 681 S.E.2d at 454 n.3; see Winston Realty Co. v.
G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 98–99, 313 S.E.2d 677, 681–82 (1985). The court’s citation of
Winston Realty is surprising as well, because Winston Realty does not apply per se analysis.
See supra notes 112–20 and accompanying text.
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-47.6.
151. See id. A separate section of the statute, however, does direct the commissioner of
labor to deny a license to a placement service whose principals have engaged in “deceptive
or unfair practices in the conduct of business.” Id. § 95-47.2(d)(3)(b)(4).
152. See Walker, 362 N.C. at 71, 653 S.E.2d at 399; Noble, 199 N.C. App. at 170–71, 681
S.E.2d at 454–55.
153. See Walker, 362 N.C. at 71, 653 S.E.2d at 399; Noble, 199 N.C. App. at 171, 681
S.E.2d at 455.
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opinions. The opinions themselves do not expressly analyze the
statutes or otherwise announce standards for upgrading.
In sum, the current standards for selective upgrading in North
Carolina are ambiguous. The case law to date leaves many of these
ambiguities unresolved.
2. Questionable Distinctions
To be sure, not every aspect of the standards for selective
upgrading is ambiguous. Even the clearly stated reasoning, however,
rests on questionable distinctions.
For example, Walker holds directly that a violation of a
regulation issued by a licensing agency does not state a per se
violation of section 75-1.1.154 To explain this conclusion, the supreme
court implied that licensing regulations are less fit for upgrading than
the insurance statute in Gray was.155 On closer review, however, these
predicate violations seem parallel. Under both the statutes in Gray
and the regulations in Walker, state officials can use administrative
proceedings as an enforcement method.156 Also, one of the statutes
that underlies the regulations in Walker allows a state agency to deny
a license when an applicant has used “unfair methods of competition
or [has] committ[ed] unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”157
To defend the holding in Walker, one might argue that a
predicate statute reflects a legislative decision to condemn certain
types of conduct, whereas a regulation is produced by unelected
decision-makers.158 This distinction between statutes and regulations,

154. Walker, 362 N.C. at 64, 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 395, 398–99; see supra notes 70–78 and
accompanying text (analyzing Walker).
155. See Walker, 362 N.C. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99; Gray v. N.C. Ins.
Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 529 S.E.2d 676, 683 (2000). This discussion in Walker
implies that Gray is a per se decision. As shown above, that implication is mistaken. See
supra notes 103–11 and accompanying text.
156. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-63-20 to -50 (providing administrative remedies
for the statutes in Gray), with id. § 143-143.13(a), (c) (providing administrative remedies
for the statutes and rules in Walker).
157. Id. § 143-143.13(a)(7).
Ken-Mar Finance v. Harvey, 90 N.C. App. 362, 368 S.E.2d 646 (1988), is
perplexing for similar reasons. The court of appeals stated in dicta that a violation of the
FTC’s Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (2013), “would not . . . constitute a
per se violation of G.S. 75-1.1.” Ken-Mar, 90 N.C. App. at 367, 368 S.E.2d at 650. Like the
regulation at issue in Walker, however, the regulation in Ken-Mar states that particular
practices are unfair and deceptive. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4).
158. See, e.g., David Arkush, Democracy and Administrative Legitimacy, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 611, 611–12 (2012) (“Agency officials write laws of general applicability
but lack the political accountability of elected legislators. . . . At the same time, the
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however, played no stated role in the Walker opinion.159 Indeed, the
supreme court implicitly rejected this distinction when it disapproved
a per se violation based on the statutes at issue.160 As these points
show, the holding in Walker rests on a questionable distinction
between licensing regulations and other predicate violations.
Other decisions on selective upgrading are likewise questionable.
The case law on upgrading of intentional torts, in particular, is a
thicket of inconsistent outcomes.161 Some intentional torts, such as
defamation, state per se violations of section 75-1.1;162 others, such as
conversion, do not.163 The decisions in this area do not acknowledge
these varying outcomes, let alone explain them.
As these examples show, the selective-upgrading opinions
contain ambiguous standards and unconvincing applications of those
standards.
C.

The Ambiguity of “as a Matter of Law”

The phrase “as a matter of law” has further tangled the
relationship between predicate violations and section 75-1.1. In the
context of section 75-1.1, this phrase has two meanings, only one of
which denotes a per se violation. This dual meaning of “as a matter of
law,” combined with the frequent use of the phrase in decisions under
section 75-1.1, has led courts to misinterpret non-per-se decisions as
per se decisions.
1. The Two Meanings of “as a Matter of Law” in This Context
In decisions on section 75-1.1, courts use the phrase “as a matter
of law” to convey two different points.
First, courts sometimes use this phrase to report that they are
upgrading a predicate violation to a per se violation of section 75-1.1.
For example, the North Carolina Court of Appeals used “as a matter

administrative process is often inaccessible to the public, . . . and the public lacks tools to
assess adequately the quality of regulatory policies and outcomes.”).
159. See Walker, 362 N.C. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99. Indeed, a leading
commentator has argued that “[Walker] did not necessarily remove all regulatory
violations from the list of per se unfair or deceptive business practices.” ALLEN, supra
note 1, § 9.04, at 9-35.
160. See Walker, 362 N.C. at 71, 653 S.E.2d at 399; see also supra notes 70–78 and
accompanying text (analyzing this aspect of Walker).
161. See generally ALLEN, supra note 1, § 19.02[3], at 19-11 to -19 (discussing the
relationship between several intentional torts and section 75-1.1).
162. See, e.g., Exclaim Mktg., LLC v. DIRECTV, Inc., No. 5:11-CV-684-FL, 2012 WL
3023429, at *9 (E.D.N.C. July 24, 2012).
163. See, e.g., Hancock v. Renshaw, 421 B.R. 738, 744 (M.D.N.C. 2009).
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of law” with this meaning in State ex rel. Edmisten v. Zim Chemical
Co.164 The defendant in Zim violated a statute that prohibited the
misbranding of antifreeze.165 The court wrote: “[T]he failure to label
the drums [of antifreeze] properly is statutorily deemed to be a
misbranding, which we in turn declare to be deceptive as a matter of
law.”166 The court did not analyze the usual conduct standard for
deception under section 75-1.1; instead, it simply upgraded the
violation of the misbranding statute to a per se violation of section 751.1. It used the phrase “as a matter of law” to state this conclusion.167
Second, and in contrast, courts often use “as a matter of law” to
state that the presence or absence of a section 75-1.1 violation is a
question of law for the court, rather than a jury question.168 Country
Club of Johnston County v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.169
illustrates this use of the phrase. The court of appeals stated: “[T]he
trial court determined, as a matter of law, that [the defendant’s] acts
constituted a violation of [section] 75-1.1.”170 Here, “as a matter of
law” described the trial court’s decision-making process, not the
164. 45 N.C. App. 604, 263 S.E.2d 849 (1980).
165. See id. at 606–07, 263 S.E.2d at 851. The misbranding statute in Zim, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 106-571 (1974), is now codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-579.6 (2013).
166. Zim, 45 N.C. App. at 608, 263 S.E.2d at 852 (emphasis added).
167. For further examples of this pattern, see, for example, ABT Bldg. Prods. Corp. v.
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 472 F.3d 99, 125 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating that a
violation of section 58-63-15(11)(f) constitutes a violation of section 75-1.1 “as a matter of
law” because such a violation is “inherently unfair”); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson,
5 F. App’x 111, 115 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[C]onduct that violates § 58-63-15(11)(f) constitutes a
violation of § 75-1.1 as a matter of law.”).
168. When courts use the phrase “as a matter of law” with this meaning, they often cite
the seminal case on judges’ and juries’ roles under section 75-1.1: Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C.
303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975). See, e.g., Atl. Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d
712, 715 (4th Cir. 1983); United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 485 F. Supp. 1049,
1058–59 (E.D.N.C. 1980), aff’d, 649 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1981); Ford v. All-Dry of the
Carolinas, Inc., No. COA10-931, 2011 WL 1483726, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2011)
(unpublished).
In Hardy, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held: “Ordinarily it would be for
the jury to determine the facts, and based on the jury’s finding, the court would then
determine, as a matter of law, whether the defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.” 288 N.C. at 310, 218 S.E.2d at 346–47.
Although Hardy largely uses the phrase “as a matter of law” to describe judges’
role under section 75-1.1, it also uses that phrase to express a per se violation. See id. at
311, 218 S.E.2d at 347. The fact that even this seminal opinion uses “as a matter of law”
with two meanings highlights the ambiguity of this phrase.
169. 150 N.C. App. 231, 563 S.E.2d 269 (2002).
170. Id. at 246, 563 S.E.2d at 279 (emphasis added). To reinforce this meaning, the
court of appeals stated: “[T]he determination of whether an act or practice is an unfair or
deceptive practice that violates N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 is a question of law for the
court . . . .” Id. (citing Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 68, 529 S.E.2d
676, 681 (2000)).
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dispositive significance of a predicate violation. In fact, a key issue in
the case was whether the absence of a predicate violation barred
liability under section 75-1.1.171
In sum, although the phrase “as a matter of law” can report a per
se violation of section 75-1.1, it can also just summarize the role of
judges in litigation under the statute.
2. Slippage in the Meaning of “as a Matter of Law”
Unsurprisingly, courts’ use of the phrase “as a matter of law” to
mean two different things has caused confusion in decisions under
section 75-1.1.
The most notable instances of this confusion involve Gray v.
North Carolina Insurance Underwriting Ass’n.172 As shown above,
Gray does not apply per se analysis.173 Nevertheless, several courts
have cited Gray to support per se holdings in later cases.174
A recent federal decision illustrates this type of error. In
Guessford v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co.,175
the court used the “as a matter of law” language in Gray to support a
per se violation of section 75-1.1.176 Citing Gray, the Guessford court
stated: “[I]f Plaintiff can prove that Defendant acted in a way that
violated [section] 58-63-15(11) . . . then Plaintiff will be able to
establish his [section 75-1.1] claim . . . .”177 This per se reasoning is a
long distance from Gray itself, a non-per-se decision in which the
court used “as a matter of law” to describe the judge’s role in a
section 75-1.1 case.178
171. See id. at 243–44, 563 S.E.2d at 277–78 (analyzing this question and answering it in
the negative).
172. 352 N.C. 61, 529 S.E.2d 676 (2000).
173. See id. at 67, 529 S.E.2d at 680; supra notes 103–11 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.
175. 983 F. Supp. 2d 652 (M.D.N.C. 2013).
176. Id. at 660.
177. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Gray, 352 N.C. at 74–75, 529 S.E.2d at 684–85). The
court also misread Country Club as a per se decision. See id. As noted above, Country
Club did not involve a predicate violation at all, so it could not involve upgrading a
predicate violation to a violation of section 75-1.1. See Country Club of Johnston Cnty. v.
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 150 N.C. App. 231, 243–44, 563 S.E.2d 269, 277–78 (2002); supra
notes 169–71 and accompanying text.
178. See Gray, 352 N.C. at 71, 529 S.E.2d at 683; see also supra notes 103–11 and
accompanying text (explaining the reasoning in Gray).
For similar misreadings of Gray, see, for example, ABT Bldg. Prods. Corp. v.
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 472 F.3d 99, 125 (4th Cir. 2006) (“In North
Carolina, a violation of section 58-63-15(11)(f) . . . constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade
practice under [section 75-1.1], as a matter of law. . . . Because the evidence supports the
jury’s finding that National Union engaged in conduct violating section 58-63-
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Winston Realty,179 likewise, has been misread as a per se case
because it uses the phrase “as a matter of law.” The court in Winston
Realty reviewed the evidence and applied the usual conduct standard
under section 75-1.1—steps that a per se analysis would not involve.180
In Noble,181 however, the North Carolina Court of Appeals cited
Winston Realty for the following proposition: “[V]iolations of certain
regulatory statutes are per se violations of [section] 75-1.1.”182 Even
more recently, in Weber, Hodges & Godwin,183 the court of appeals
cited Winston Realty for the proposition that “[v]iolations of
regulatory statutes can constitute per se unfair acts” that violate
section 75-1.1.184 In both decisions, the court of appeals recounted the
passage in Winston Realty that uses the phrase “as a matter of law.”185
As these cases illustrate, the ambiguous phrase “as a matter of
law” has compounded the problems with per se theories and related
theories under section 75-1.1.
IV. REFINING PER SE THEORIES UNDER SECTION 75-1.1
As part III of this Article shows, the standards for per se
violations and similar violations of section 75-1.1 are in disarray. This
part IV proposes three solutions to these problems. Section IV(A)
lays out two relatively simple solutions. Section IV(B) lays out a
third, more ambitious, one. As shown below, the North Carolina
courts can and should adopt all three solutions.

15(11)(f) . . . and because such a violation is ‘inherently unfair’ and a violation of [section
75-1.1], the district court’s ruling that National Union violated [section 75-1.1] was not
erroneous.” (citing Gray, 352 N.C. at 70, 529 S.E.2d at 683)); Walker v. Fleetwood Homes
of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 70–71, 653 S.E.2d 393, 398–99 (2007) (noting that “this Court
has previously held that violations of some statutes, such as those concerning the insurance
industry, can constitute unfair and deceptive trade practices as a matter of law” (citing
Gray, 352 N.C. at 71, 529 S.E.2d at 683), then stating that in Gray the court had discerned
“the General Assembly’s intent to equate a violation of [a predicate] statute with the more
general provision of § 75-1.1” (emphasis added)); Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC),
LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 170, 681 S.E.2d 448, 454 (2009) (citing Gray, 352 N.C. at 71, 529
S.E.2d at 683, for the proposition that “North Carolina appellate courts have held that
violations of certain regulatory statutes are per se violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1”).
179. Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 97, 331 S.E.2d 677, 681 (1985).
180. See id. at 97–98, 331 S.E.2d at 681–82; supra note 120 and accompanying text.
181. Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 681 S.E.2d 448
(2009).
182. Id. at 170, 681 S.E.2d at 454. The court cited Gray for the same proposition. Id.
183. Weber Hodges & Godwin Commercial Real Estate Servs., LLC v. Hartley, No.
COA13-207, 2013 WL 4716368 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished).
184. Id. at *4.
185. See id. (quoting Winston Realty, 314 N.C. at 98–99, 331 S.E.2d at 677); Noble, 199
N.C. App. at 170, 681 S.E.2d at 454 (paraphrasing Winston Realty).
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A. Two Easy Solutions: Avoiding Ambiguous Holdings and “Split
the Difference” Decisions
Two straightforward solutions would address some of the
analytical problems with per se violations of section 75-1.1.
First, courts should avoid stating their conclusions in ambiguous
phrases like “as a matter of law” and “may be.” As shown above,
these phrases obscure the meaning of opinions under section 75-1.1.186
They also promote slippage from one decision to another, where
ambiguous phrasing causes narrow precedents to be misunderstood in
later cases.187
Second, courts should disown the near relatives of per se
violations. No decision to date explains when the various near
relatives apply, or why these variations even exist.188 In addition,
when many of the near-relative decisions describe how predicate
violations affect section 75-1.1 claims, the decisions say, in essence, “it
depends.”189 Holdings like these give future courts no reference points
to guide their analysis.190
These problems call for abandoning the near relatives outright.
To decide the relationship between a predicate violation and section
75-1.1, courts should choose between two options: (1) recognizing a
per se violation or (2) applying the regular conduct standards under
section 75-1.1.
Requiring a choice between those two options is likely, over
time, to strengthen North Carolina doctrine on upgrading. Gray
illustrates the opportunities for improvement. The parties in that case
debated difficult questions on per se liability: whether a predicate
violation that was missing a key element, and that involved a
statutory disclaimer of a private cause of action, could nonetheless
establish a per se violation of section 75-1.1.191 A near-relative
analysis, however, led the Supreme Court of North Carolina to avoid
these questions. The court did not find a per se violation, but it still
held that a predicate violation could be an “example[] of conduct to

186. See supra notes 119–28, 164–85 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 123–28, 172–85 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 93–137 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 99–100, 111, 123–28, 131–36 and accompanying text.
190. In contrast, if courts adopt the analysis proposed below, they will have extensive
reference points: decisions, statements, and scholarship on section 5. See infra notes 225–
34 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
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support a finding of unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”192 If earlier
decisions had ruled out this type of difference splitting, the court
might well have analyzed the upgrading issues that the case
presented.193 Further, if Gray had addressed upgrading, the supreme
court’s guidance would have eased the courts’ struggles in later per se
cases.194
B.

Tackling the Bigger Challenge: Except in Cases of Explicit or
Semi-Explicit Upgrading, Apply the “Public Policy” Aspect of the
Unfairness Doctrine

At the same time that courts take the steps described above, they
should address the core problem with per se violations of section 751.1: the murky standards for upgrading predicate violations.
This subsection of the Article proposes that courts limit per se
violations to cases of explicit or semi-explicit upgrading. Outside of
these cases, courts should instead apply the unfairness doctrine under
section 75-1.1. To apply this doctrine, courts should consult an
accepted source of law under section 75-1.1: the law under section 5
of the FTC Act. Section 5 doctrine defines the violations of external
norms that transgress public policy and thus are unfair.
1. Limiting Per Se Violations to Cases of Explicit or Semi-Explicit
Upgrading
As shown above, North Carolina courts have struggled to decide
when to upgrade predicate violations that have no stated connection
with section 75-1.1. It is time to abandon this struggle. Instead, the
courts should recognize per se violations only in cases of explicit
upgrading or semi-explicit upgrading.195 Limiting per se violations to
these cases makes sense for several reasons.
192. Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 529 S.E.2d 676, 683 (2000);
see id. at 67, 529 S.E.2d at 680 (“Plaintiffs contend that defendant violated [the predicate
statute] constituting a violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 and that defendant violated N.C.G.S.
§ 75-1.1 separate from and not based upon a violation of [the predicate statute]. We agree
with plaintiffs’ latter contention.”).
193. See supra notes 104–11 and accompanying text.
194. Later courts have been unsure how close Gray comes to recognizing a per se
violation. See supra notes 174–78 and accompanying text. They have also had trouble
applying the upgrading standards in Gray. See, e.g., Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC),
LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 170, 681 S.E.2d 448, 454 (2009) (synthesizing Gray and other
decisions by stating that courts recognize per se violations “only where the regulatory
statute [that makes up the predicate violation] specifically defines and proscribes conduct
which is unfair or deceptive within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1”).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 44–51 (defining and discussing these forms of
upgrading).
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First, upgrading involves high stakes. When a court upgrades a
predicate violation, that decision, in one stroke, satisfies the conduct
standard under section 75-1.1.196 Upgrading turns a claim that allows
single damages into one that generates automatic treble damages and
possible attorney fees.197 Indeed, upgrading can produce this effect
even when a predicate violation lacks any private right of action of its
own.198 The law should not produce these case-changing results based
on weak standards.
Second, the standards for selective upgrading currently lack
rigor. As shown above, decisions on selective upgrading suffer from
ambiguous language and questionable distinctions.199 Indeed, it is not
even clear whether the two current standards for selective upgrading
are cumulative or alternative.200
Third, treating explicit and semi-explicit upgrading more
favorably than selective upgrading is only logical. In cases of explicit
upgrading, the General Assembly has already stated that a violation
of a given statute or regulation is a violation of section 75-1.1.201 Semiexplicit upgrading has an equally strong legislative basis. When a
statute or regulation calls misconduct in a particular context unfair or
deceptive, there can be little doubt that the lawmakers equate that
misconduct with a violation of section 75-1.1.202
Fourth, courts need not engage in selective upgrading to define
the relationship between predicate violations and section 75-1.1.
Instead, they can apply a non-per-se analysis: the unfairness doctrine
196. See supra notes 7–9, 37 and accompanying text (defining a per se violation as one
that has this effect).
197. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-16, -16.1(1) (2013).
198. See, e.g., Guessford v. Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 652, 660
(M.D.N.C. 2013) (noting that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(11) creates no private right of
action, but then stating: “[I]f Plaintiff can prove that Defendant acted in a way that
violated § 58-63-15(11), and that he suffered an actual injury proximately caused by that
violation, then Plaintiff will be able to establish his [section 75-1.1] claim and thereby may
seek treble damages arising from the alleged [section 75-1.1] violation”); see also id. at 666
(applying this per se theory and granting offensive summary judgment on a plaintiff’s
claim under section 75-1.1).
199. See supra notes 140–63 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 147–57 and accompanying text.
201. See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 11, § 3.2.6, at 181 (“Such language leaves no
room for doubt about the availability of a UDAP cause of action . . . .”); see also ALLEN,
supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-8 n.22 (listing statutes with cross-references to section 75-1.1).
202. See, e.g., Dickson v. Rucho, 366 N.C. 332, 341, 737 S.E.2d 362, 369 (2013) (“It is
always presumed that the Legislature acted with full knowledge of prior and existing law.”
(quoting Ridge Cmty. Investors, Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 695, 239 S.E.2d 566, 570
(1977))); see also CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 11, § 3.2.7.4.1, at 190 (“If a statute says
that it was enacted to prevent unfair and deceptive acts, then surely a violation is a UDAP
violation.”).
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under section 75-1.1.203 As shown below, an aspect of the unfairness
doctrine—the rule that violations of an established public policy are
unfair—already provides standards for the relationship between
predicate violations and section 75-1.1.204
2. Replacing Selective Upgrading with the Public-Policy Aspect of
Unfairness
In the absence of explicit or semi-explicit upgrading, courts
should not apply per se analysis or any of its variants. Instead, they
should ask whether the conduct that establishes a predicate violation
satisfies the test for unfairness under section 75-1.1.205
The unfairness test, after all, already refers to predicate statutes
and other external standards. One part of the test asks whether a
defendant’s conduct “offends public policy as it has been established
by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—whether, in other words, it
is within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or
other established concept of unfairness.”206
When North Carolina courts apply this public-policy aspect of
unfairness, they need not do so without guidance. Pronouncements
under section 5 of the FTC—the statute on which section 75-1.1 is
based—define the violations of external sources of public policy that
rise to the level of unfairness.207
As shown below, replacing selective upgrading with the publicpolicy test for unfairness will make the problems with selective
upgrading moot. This approach will also give the courts more chances
to apply, and thus refine, the public-policy analysis itself.
a. The Public-Policy Aspect of the North Carolina Test for
Unfairness
Section 75-1.1, of course, allows for more than per se
violations.208 Case law on the widest-ranging aspect of section 75-1.1—

203. See generally Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2050–52 (describing the key
features of the unfairness doctrine under section 75-1.1).
204. See infra notes 208–20 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 206–07, 236–45 and accompanying text.
206. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 263 n.6, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621
n.6 (1980) (emphasis added) (quoting FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244
n.5 (1972)), overruled on other grounds by Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans,
Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988).
207. See infra notes 221–34 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (listing the major types of section 75-1.1
violations).
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unfairness—refers to sources of law outside section 75-1.1, under the
heading of public policy.
The relevant part of the North Carolina definition of unfairness
states that a “practice is unfair when it offends established public
policy.”209 No North Carolina decisions, however, define the public
policies that support a violation of section 75-1.1. Indeed, most
decisions address the public-policy aspect of unfairness only
summarily.210
Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC211 illustrates this
pattern. The plaintiffs alleged that a bar served them and their
companion an excessive number of drinks, resulting in a drunkdriving accident.212 They claimed that the bar violated North Carolina
alcohol statutes and related regulations.213 They went on to argue that
these violations supported a section 75-1.1 violation because, among
other reasons,214 the bar’s actions “offend[ed] established public
policy.”215 The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however, did not
analyze whether the alcohol statutes and regulations announced a
public policy that could support a section 75-1.1 violation. The court
stated only that the one case that the plaintiffs cited was not on

209. E.g., Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 367 N.C. 81, 91, 747 S.E.2d 220, 228 (2013)
(quoting Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 72, 653 S.E.2d 393, 399
(2007)). This public-policy aspect of unfairness under section 75-1.1 has existed since 1980.
See Johnson, 300 N.C. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621, quoted supra text accompanying note 206.
In Johnson, the Supreme Court of North Carolina described the public-policy aspect of
unfairness by quoting an FTC definition of unfairness under section 5. See Johnson, 300
N.C. at 262–64, 266 S.E.2d at 620–21 (citing, among other decisions, FTC v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972)); Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2057–
63 (describing the history of this test in FTC doctrine); see also infra notes 221–34 and
accompanying text (recommending using section 5 doctrine to shape the public-policy test
under section 75-1.1).
210. See infra notes 252–64 and accompanying text. In fact, the public-policy aspect of
unfairness under section 75-1.1 is currently applied so rarely that the leading treatise on
section 75-1.1 mentions it only briefly. See ALLEN, supra note 1, § 19.02, at 19-4 to -5.
211. 199 N.C. App. 163, 170, 681 S.E.2d 448, 454 (2009).
212. Id. at 164–65, 681 S.E.2d at 450–51.
213. Id. at 169–70, 681 S.E.2d at 453–54.
214. The plaintiffs also argued that the violations of the alcohol statutes and
regulations established a per se violation of section 75-1.1. See id. at 167–71, 681 S.E.2d at
452–55; see also supra notes 145–46, 149–53 and accompanying text (discussing the per se
analysis in Noble).
215. Noble, 199 N.C. App. at 172, 681 S.E.2d at 455. In addition to seeking the
enhanced remedies associated with a section 75-1.1 claim, the plaintiffs apparently
pursued a section 75-1.1 claim to avoid the defense of contributory negligence. See id.; see
also Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 96, 331 S.E.2d 677, 681 (1985)
(holding that contributory negligence is not a defense under section 75-1.1).
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point.216 Thus, Noble, like other similar decisions,217 does not establish
standards to decide which violations of public policy show unfairness.
In two other decisions, the court of appeals has held that
violations of a North Carolina usury statute establish a public-policybased violation of section 75-1.1.218 In both cases, however, the court
had an unusually easy path to this conclusion. The usury statute
provides that “[i]t is the paramount public policy of North Carolina to
protect North Carolina resident borrowers through the application of
North Carolina interest laws.”219 In view of this express statutory
language, the court did not discuss how it would analyze less graphic
expressions of public policy.220

216. See Noble, 199 N.C. App. at 172, 681 S.E.2d at 455. The decision that the plaintiffs
cited did not address liability under section 75-1.1. Instead, it held that a bar’s negligence
supported liability under a North Carolina alcohol statute. See Hutchens v. Hankins, 63
N.C. App. 1, 12, 303 S.E.2d 584, 591 (1983), cited in Noble, 199 N.C. App. at 172, 681
S.E.2d at 455.
217. See, e.g., Spinks v. Taylor, 303 N.C. 256, 265, 278 S.E.2d 501, 506 (1981) (“We
cannot say that defendant’s padlocking procedures offend ‘established public policy’ . . . .”
(quoting Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 263, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621
(1980), overruled on other grounds by Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc.,
323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988))); Adams v. Jones, 114 N.C. App. 256, 259, 441 S.E.2d
699, 700 (1994) (holding, without explanation, that an agreement produced by extortion
not only was “void as against public policy,” but also violated the public-policy aspect of
the unfairness doctrine under section 75-1.1).
The leading decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court on the public-policy
aspect of unfairness, Stanley v. Moore, 339 N.C. 717, 454 S.E.2d 225 (1995), likewise
analyzes the policy behind the relevant statute only summarily. The statute at issue in
Stanley contained an explicit declaration of public policy. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-25.6
(2013), quoted in Stanley, 339 N.C. at 724, 454 S.E.2d at 229. Thus, the supreme court was
able to conclude easily that the statute “embodies the public policy of this state, as
determined by the legislature, that residential tenants not be evicted through self-help
measures without resort to judicial process.” Stanley, 339 N.C. at 724, 454 S.E.2d at 228–
29.
In fact, Stanley did not actually decide whether the predicate statute supported
liability under section 75-1.1. The court of appeals had already found a violation of section
75-1.1. Stanley v. Moore, 113 N.C. App. 523, 525–26, 439 S.E.2d 250, 252 (1994), rev’d, 339
N.C. 717, 454 S.E.2d 339 (1995). It had concluded, however, that a remedy-limiting
provision in the predicate statute barred the courts from awarding treble damages or
attorney fees based on the section 75-1.1 claim. Id. at 527, 439 S.E.2d at 252–53. That
remedial limit was the only conclusion that the plaintiff appealed further, so it was the
only conclusion that the supreme court could review and reverse. See Stanley, 339 N.C. at
720, 454 S.E.2d at 226–27.
218. See Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 192 N.C. App. 298, 319–20, 665 S.E.2d 767, 780–81
(2008); State ex rel. Cooper v. NCCS Loans, Inc., 174 N.C. App. 630, 641, 624 S.E.2d 371,
378 (2005).
219. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2.1(g).
220. See Odell, 192 N.C. App. at 319–20, 665 S.E.2d at 780–81; NCCS Loans, 174 N.C.
App. at 641, 624 S.E.2d at 378.
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As these cases illustrate, the public-policy aspect of unfairness
has the potential to take over the function of selective upgrading:
identifying sources of law that do not refer to section 75-1.1, but still
establish a section 75-1.1 violation. In North Carolina, however, the
public-policy theory has suffered from a lack of standards. The next
subsection of this Article identifies a source of standards that will
improve the public-policy theory (both in its own right and as a
replacement for selective upgrading).
b. Section 5 Standards on Public Policy
To find standards to guide the public-policy analysis under
section 75-1.1, courts can turn to an already accepted source of law:
doctrine under section 5.
As noted above, section 75-1.1 shares its substantive language
with section 5.221 Courts in North Carolina have long cited the parallel
language of the two statutes as a reason to take guidance from section
5 authorities.222 For example, in a seminal decision on section 75-1.1,
Marshall v. Miller,223 the Supreme Court of North Carolina called it
“established” that “federal decisions interpreting the FTC Act may
be used as guidance in determining the scope and meaning of G.S. 751.1.”224
A key FTC pronouncement under section 5 clarifies the role of
public policy in the unfairness doctrine, as well as the types of public
policy that can play that role. In a 1980 statement on unfairness, the
FTC announced that it would treat violations of external sources of
public policy as “additional evidence on the degree of consumer
injury caused by specific practices.”225
221. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 308, 218 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1975); Sykes v.
Health Network Solutions, Inc., No. 13 CVS 2595, 2013 WL 6410591, at *3 (N.C. Bus. Ct.
Dec. 5, 2013); see also Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2066–68 (discussing other
decisions to the same effect).
223. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
224. Id. at 542, 276 S.E.2d at 399. In an earlier article, Kip Nelson and I have urged
North Carolina courts to use this authority and to seek guidance from section 5 authorities
on the meaning of unfairness under section 75-1.1. Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at
2070–82.
225. Letter from the FTC to Sens. Ford & Danforth (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in Int’l
Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070, 1075 (1984) [hereinafter 1980 Statement, with
pinpoint citations to the reprint in International Harvester]; see, e.g., Remarks of
Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga Before the Third International Conference on
Consumer Law (Mar. 11, 1992), reprinted in [1985–1997 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 50,076, at 48,790 (describing the changes brought about by the 1980 Statement);
Letter from the FTC to Sens. Packwood and Kasten (Mar. 5, 1982), reprinted in 42
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1055, at 568, 570 (Mar. 11, 1982) (same;

CITE AS 92 N.C. L. REV. 1881 (2014)

1926

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

When one considers substitutes for selective upgrading, however,
the more notable part of the 1980 Statement is its discussion of when
violations of public policy independently suffice to show unfairness.
The 1980 Statement lays out the following principles:
•

Violations of external sources of public policy can
independently show unfairness only “when the policy is so
clear that it will entirely determine the question of consumer
injury. . . . In these cases the legislature or court, in
announcing the policy, has already determined that such
injury does exist and thus [consumer injury] need not be
expressly proved in each instance.”226

•

To qualify as a standard for unfairness, a public “policy
should be declared or embodied in formal sources such as
statutes, judicial decisions, or the Constitution as interpreted
by the courts, rather than being ascertained from the general
sense of the national values.”227

•

“The policy should likewise be one that is widely shared, and
not the isolated decision of a single state or a single court.”228

containing no reference to public policy as an independent basis for finding unfairness); J.
Howard Beales III, Director, Bureau of Consumer Prot., Fed. Trade Comm’n, The FTC’s
Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and Resurrection, 22 J. PUB. POL’Y &
MARKETING 192, 193 (2003) (discussing the history of the 1980 Statement); Stephen
Calkins, FTC Unfairness: An Essay, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1935, 1952–54 (2000) (same).
226. 1980 Statement, supra note 225, at 1075.
227. Id. at 1076. As this language implies, the 1980 Statement ends the practice of
finding unfairness based on the penumbra of a statute, regulation, or judge-made theory.
See David L. Belt, Should the FTC’s Current Criteria for Determining “Unfair Acts or
Practices” Be Applied to State “Little FTC Acts”?, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 3 (Feb. 2010),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Feb10_Belt2_25
f.authcheckdam.pdf (noting this effect of the 1980 Statement); see also id. at 10 (“The
difficulty of determining or explaining to a jury the boundaries of the ‘penumbra’ of an
‘established concept of unfairness’ [is] obvious.”); cf. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 300 N.C. 247, 263 n.6, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621 n.6 (1980) (quoting the FTC’s pre-1980
definition of unfairness, including its reference to penumbras), overruled on other grounds
by Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988).
A Maryland decision illustrates the effects of rejecting this penumbral version of
the public-policy theory. See Legg v. Castruccio, 642 A.2d 906, 918–19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1994). In Legg, Maryland’s intermediate appellate court decided to follow the FTC’s 1980
Statement as the standard for unfairness under Maryland’s section 5 analogue. See id. at
917–18 & n.5. Applying this standard, the court rejected an argument that even though
certain regulatory statutes did not apply by their own terms, they could support a publicpolicy-based claim of unfairness. See id. at 918–20.
228. 1980 Statement, supra note 225, at 1076; see Calkins, supra note 225, at 1955.
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Finally, to qualify as a standard for unfairness, a policy
should be unambiguous.229

Applying these principles, the FTC has accepted public-policy
theories that have a firm grounding in state and federal decisions and
statutes.230 It has rejected theories that rely on ephemeral sources of
law231 or sources of law that do not apply to the conduct at issue.232
In sum, the 1980 Statement offers a helpful standard for
predicate violations that show unfairness: violations that are
convincingly recognized as unambiguous evidence of unjustified
injury to consumers.233 Given the North Carolina courts’ history of
looking to section 5 authorities to define section 75-1.1, the 1980
Statement is a logical source of standards to flesh out the publicpolicy analysis under section 75-1.1.234
229. See 1980 Statement, supra note 225, at 1075–76 (stating twice that a public policy,
to suffice to show unfairness, should be clear); Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair
Acts or Practices” in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 GEO. L.J. 225, 278
(1981) (summarizing this aspect of the 1980 Statement as follows: “Finally, an enforceable
public policy must be relatively specific. It must grant certain rights or prohibit certain
practices in terms that are free from ambiguity.”).
230. See, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009) (affirming
liability under section 5 when a defendant subverted the privacy safeguards in
Telecommunications Act § 222, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012)); Horizon Corp., 97 F.T.C. 464, 851
& n.73 (1981) (holding, based on U.C.C. § 2-302 and “a developing trend in state and
federal law,” 97 F.T.C. at 851, that forfeiture clauses in land-sale contracts violate the
public-policy aspect of unfairness); see also Amrep Corp., 102 F.T.C. 1362, 1668–69 (1983)
(following the reasoning in Horizon), aff’d, 768 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1985).
231. See, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263, 332 (1986) (rejecting the
argument that state enforcers’ decisions not to take action against Orkin’s conduct showed
a public policy that barred an unfairness claim by the FTC), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir.
1988).
232. See, e.g., Beltone Elecs. Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68, 219–20 (1982) (rejecting the claim
that the physician-patient privilege established a public policy that barred Beltone from
turning over customers’ names from terminated hearing-aid dealers to successor dealers or
other businesses).
233. See 1980 Statement, supra note 225, at 1075–76; see also Belt, supra note 227, at 11
(“By requiring public policy to be clear and well-established before it could provide an
independent basis for a finding of unfairness . . . , the [1980 Statement] removed significant
potential ambiguity from the criteria for determining unfairness.”).
234. See, e.g., Henderson v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 346 N.C. 741, 749, 488 S.E.2d 234,
239 (1997) (noting that section 75-1.1 “is patterned after section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, and we look to federal case law for guidance in interpreting the
statute”); see also Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2065–68 (analyzing the relationship
between section 5 and section 75-1.1).
In 1994, Congress codified most of the 1980 Statement in a new subsection (n) of
section 5. That subsection further narrows the role of public policy as a basis for unfairness
enforcement. Under subsection 5(n), “public policy considerations may not serve as a
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Benefits of the Suggested Approach

To solve the problems with selective upgrading, this Article
recommends that courts recognize per se violations of section 75-1.1
only in cases of explicit or semi-explicit upgrading.235 In all other cases
with predicate violations, courts should apply the public-policy aspect
of unfairness under section 75-1.1, using section 5 doctrine to shape
their analysis of public policy.236 This approach would offer a number
of benefits.
First and foremost, the suggested approach would give courts a
workable alternative to selective upgrading. Because selective
upgrading dramatically expands the remedies for a predicate
violation,237 courts have often avoided selective upgrading, even when
it might have been justified.238 In addition, courts have insufficient
tools to help them decide whether to engage in selective upgrading.239
primary basis for” FTC determinations that an act or practice is unfair. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
Unlike the 1980 Statement, however, this statutory limit on the FTC’s ability to rely on
public policy is unlikely to carry over to section 75-1.1. The legislative history of subsection
5(n) states expressly that the enactment is not meant to change the interpretation of states’
section 5 analogues. See S. REP. NO. 103-130, at 13, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1776,
1788 (“Sound principles of federalism limit the impact of this section to the FTC only.”).
The 1980 Statement, in contrast, has no similar history. See Michael M. Greenfield,
Unfairness Under Section 5 of the FTC Act and Its Impact on State Law, 46 WAYNE L.
REV. 1869, 1895–1934 (2000) (detailing how states have responded to the 1980 Statement).
In a recent illustration of the differences between state unfairness doctrines and
section 5, a prominent “patent troll” settled claims under New York’s section 5 analogue
on the same day that the company sued the FTC, asserting that section 5 did not apply to
its patent-enforcement activities. Compare Assurance of Discontinuance, In re MPHJ
Tech. Invs., LLC, No. 14-015 (N.Y. Att’y Gen. Jan. 13, 2014), available at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/FINALAODMPHJ.pdf, with Complaint ¶¶ 139–60, MPHJ
Tech. Invs., LLC v. FTC, No. 6:14-cv-11-WSS (W.D. Tex. filed Jan. 13, 2014), available at
http://patentlyo.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/gov.uscourts.txwd.669787.1.0.pdf.
235. See supra notes 195–204 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 139–63 and
accompanying text (discussing the problems in North Carolina selective-upgrading
doctrine).
236. See supra notes 221–34 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-16, -16.1(1) (2013) (allowing treble damages and
attorney fees for violations of section 75-1.1); see also Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at
2038–41 (discussing the effects of the lucrative remedies for section 75-1.1 claims).
238. See, e.g., Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of North Carolina, Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 71, 653
S.E.2d 393, 399 (2007); Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 67, 529 S.E.2d
676, 680 (2000); Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 171, 681
S.E.2d 448, 455 (2009); see also supra notes 104–11, 141–60 (discussing the analysis in these
decisions).
239. For example, in Walker, the Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded that
violations of licensing regulations generally, and even violations of the licensing statutes at
issue, would not support selective upgrading. See 362 N.C. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 298–99.
The court, however, gave only limited reasons for these conclusions. See id., quoted supra
text accompanying note 69.

CITE AS 92 N.C. L. REV. 1881 (2014)

2014]

PER SE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES

1929

This lack of tools has led courts to create unexplained new theories—
the near relatives—to justify rulings without adopting approaches that
seem too absolute.240
The public-policy approach would address the root cause of
these problems: a lack of standards.241 As the FTC’s 1980 Statement
on unfairness illustrates, there is thoughtful jurisprudence on
unfairness standards under section 5.242 Indeed, this jurisprudence is
constantly being expanded by new decisions and new scholarship.243
Given how difficult it is for courts to create upgrading standards out
240. See supra notes 93–138 and accompanying text (discussing the near relatives and
their role as coping mechanisms).
241. See supra notes 139–63 and accompanying text.
A few states have created upgrading standards by adopting statutes or regulations
on upgrading itself. See FLA. STAT. § 501.203 (2013); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 04.02.01.033
(2013); 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.16 (1994); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 15, § 60-8.090
(2011). There is no indication, however, that the legislature or any state agency in North
Carolina is poised to do the same.
242. See, e.g., Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2056–64 (discussing this
jurisprudence); cf. Calkins, supra note 225, at 1942 n.27 (“The FTC is, if anything, overstudied . . . .”).
243. For example, when the FTC approved a recent consent decree with Apple, the
commissioners debated whether the unfairness criteria in the 1980 Statement were
violated by an undisclosed App Store feature that allowed users to avoid reentering their
passwords on a strict transaction-by-transaction basis—a feature that allowed some
children to make unauthorized purchases. Compare Statement of Chairwoman Ramirez
and Commissioner Brill at 3, Apple Inc., No. 1123018 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Jan. 15, 2014),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/140115applestatement
ramirezbrill.pdf (reasoning that Apple’s failure to disclose this feature caused a substantial
consumer injury in an absolute sense), with Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Wright
at 11–16, Apple Inc., available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/
140115applestatementwright_0.pdf (reasoning that Apple’s failure to disclose the feature
was not unfair because, among other points, the nondisclosure offered some users
increased convenience that outweighed the injuries that the nondisclosure caused for
other users).
In another example that shows the rigor of unfairness decisions under section 5, a
federal court ruled that consumers and businesses whose credit information was stolen
from the computers of Wyndham hotels could suffer a substantial injury even if federal
statutes and the practices of most credit-card issuers would shield those consumers and
businesses from any unauthorized charges. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 2:13CV-1887, 2014 WL 1349019, at *15–18 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2014), petition for leave to appeal
granted, No. 14-8091 (3d Cir. July 29, 2014).
Even so, some scholars argue that individual decisions and consent decrees like
these offer too little guidance to businesses. This scholarship urges the FTC to make
further policy statements that would expand on the 1980 Statement, especially in difficult
areas like data security. See, e.g., GEOFFREY A. MANNE, HUMILITY, INSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS AND ECONOMIC RIGOR: LIMITING THE FTC’S DISCRETION 35–37 (2014),
available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Supplemental-Testimony-Manne-CMT-FTC-100-Academic-Perspective-2014-2-28.pdf. If
the FTC responds to these suggestions, the resulting guidelines will add further to the
materials that courts can use to help them apply section 75-1.1.
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of whole cloth,244 courts would benefit from using authorities on
public policy under section 5 to decide which predicate violations
justify liability under section 75-1.1.245
Second, driving selective-upgrading cases into the public-policy
aspect of unfairness would help courts refine the public-policy
analysis itself. As noted above, few North Carolina decisions apply
the public-policy aspect of unfairness.246 If courts used the publicpolicy analysis to decide cases in which litigants rely on external
standards, this “game pressure” would probably lead courts to
analyze public policy more thoroughly.247 Over time, by asking
whether predicate violations reflect unambiguous conclusions of
unjustified injuries,248 the courts could achieve a more predictable
relationship between predicate violations and section 75-1.1.
Third, limiting per se violations to cases of explicit or semiexplicit upgrading will give the General Assembly an incentive to
decide the scope of per se liability expressly. In recent years, the
legislature has enacted a number of statements that a violation of a
given statute is also a violation of section 75-1.1.249 If courts ended
selective upgrading, eliminated the near relatives of per se violations,
and began analyzing the public-policy basis of predicate violations,250
the General Assembly might well engage in explicit upgrading more
often. At a minimum, the legislature would know the courts’
approach to upgrading, so it would have a clear foundation on which
to build new law on the scope of section 75-1.1.251
244. See, e.g., Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 170, 681
S.E.2d 448, 454 (2009) (illustrating these difficulties).
245. See, e.g., Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2072–78 (discussing the benefits of
using section 5 doctrine to shape other aspects of the unfairness doctrine under section 751.1).
246. See supra notes 208–20 and accompanying text.
247. The Associated Press, Duke Ends Tech’s Season with 82-70 Victory,
ACCESSNORTHGA.COM (Mar. 14, 2008, 10:15 PM), http://www.accessnorthga.com/
detail.php?n=208012&c=5 (quoting Duke University basketball coach Mike Krzyzewski’s
use of the term “game pressure” to describe the prospect that one’s actions will decide the
outcome of a game); supra notes 206–18 and accompanying text (noting that most publicpolicy cases to date contain only conclusory analysis).
248. See supra notes 223–32 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47H-8 (2013) (enacted 2010); id. § 14-344.2 (enacted
2008); id. § 66-67.5 (enacted 2007); id. § 66-356 (enacted 2006); id. § 75-38 (enacted 2003).
250. See supra notes 195–234 and accompanying text.
251. The General Assembly has a history of responding to significant changes in the
case law under section 75-1.1. The most notable response occurred after the Supreme
Court of North Carolina decided, in State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C.
311, 320, 233 S.E.2d 895, 901 (1977), that section 75-1.1 did not cover debt-collection
practices. Within the same year, the legislature enacted subsection 75-1.1(b), which states
that, except for certain express exclusions, section 75-1.1 covers “all business activities,
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D. Examples of How the Proposed Analysis Would Affect North
Carolina Decisions
If courts limit per se violations of section 75-1.1 to cases of
explicit or semi-explicit upgrading and replace selective upgrading
with the unfairness doctrine, those changes will affect the outcome of
some, but not all, section 75-1.1 cases.
For example, under the approach proposed here, Walker252
would produce a per se violation, not the rejection of one. In the
predicate regulations at issue in Walker, the types of conduct that
occurred in that case are specifically described as “unfair or deceptive
acts or practices.”253 Likewise, the predicate statute in Walker allows a
regulatory agency to deny, suspend, or revoke licenses when licensees
“commit[] unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”254
In light of these express references to unfair or deceptive
conduct, the Supreme Court of North Carolina could have decided
the case by applying semi-explicit upgrading, instead of rejecting
selective upgrading.255 If not for the pressures of selective upgrading,
the court would not have needed to decide that a violation of a
licensing regulation or a “regulatory statute” fails to state a per se
violation of section 75-1.1.256 The textual connection between the
predicate violations and unfair or deceptive practices would have
prevailed over the fact that the predicate violations were
“regulatory.”257
however denominated.” Act of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, § 2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 984, 984
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b)); see also Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
300 N.C. 247, 261 n.5, 266 S.E.2d 610, 620 n.5 (1980) (noting that this statutory amendment
occurred “in the wake of our decision in Penney”), overruled on other grounds by Myers &
Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988).
252. Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 653 S.E.2d 393 (2007); see
supra notes 58–80 and accompanying text (discussing the key reasoning in Walker).
253. 11 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 8.0907 (2014); see Walker, 362 N.C. at 69, 653 S.E.2d at 398
(quoting the jury’s findings, which tracked the wording of 11 N.C. ADMIN. CODE
8.0907(1)–(4)).
254. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-143.13(a)(7); see Walker, 362 N.C. at 69–70, 653 S.E.2d at
398 (quoting trial court’s judgment, which referred to this statute).
255. See Walker, 362 N.C. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99 (considering and rejecting
selective upgrading), quoted supra in text accompanying note 69.
256. Id. at 70, 653 S.E.2d at 398; see id. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99; see also supra
notes 196–98 and accompanying text (discussing the high stakes of selective upgrading).
257. Walker, 362 N.C. at 70, 71, 653 S.E.2d at 398, 399. Indeed, in Gray and Winston
Realty, the court had already rejected the argument that other statutes cannot support
liability under section 75-1.1 because those statutes contemplate regulation by an
administrative agency. See Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 529
S.E.2d 676, 683 (2000) (“Although N.C.G.S. § 58-63-15(11) does regulate settlement
claims in the insurance industry, insurance companies are not immune to the general
principles and provisions of [section] 75-1.1.”); Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314
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In contrast, if the courts adopted the analysis proposed here, the
relationship between common-law fraud and section 75-1.1 would
change in form, but not in substance.258 As a nonstatutory theory,
fraud has no text that could support explicit or semi-explicit
upgrading.259 Thus, under the analysis proposed here, courts would
apply the public-policy aspect of unfairness under section 75-1.1.
They would ask whether fraud is convincingly recognized as offering
unambiguous evidence of unjustified injury to consumers.260
Courts would surely answer yes to this question. As the Supreme
Court of North Carolina has recognized, the General Assembly
enacted section 75-1.1 to make it easier for customers to recover for
fraud and other deceptive conduct.261 Likewise, fraud and other forms
of deception are the main concern that led to the enactment of similar
statutes in other states262 and the “deceptive acts or practices” aspect
of section 5.263
As this history shows, preventing fraud is a widely shared public
policy—the type of policy that courts are likely to enforce through the
unfairness doctrine under section 75-1.1.264 Thus, under the analysis
proposed here, fraud will no longer be a per se violation of section 751.1, but it will violate the statute nonetheless.
N.C. 90, 97, 331 S.E.2d 677, 681 (1985) (rejecting the arguments that section 75-1.1 could
not apply because the predicate statute was “regulatory in nature” and that “the authority
to enforce the [statute] rests with the Commissioner of Labor”).
258. See, e.g., Kettle v. Leonard, No. 7:11-CV-189-BR, 2012 WL 4086595, at *12–13
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 2012); Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975).
But cf. Keister v. Nat’l Council of the Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of the U.S., No. 12
CVS 1137, 2013 WL 3864583, at *3 (N.C. Bus. Ct. July 18, 2013) (“Fraud or
misrepresentation occurring during a commercial transaction is not a per se violation of
Chapter 75, but such conduct can be the basis of a claim under Chapter 75.”).
259. See supra notes 44–51 and accompanying text (defining explicit and semi-explicit
upgrading).
260. See supra notes 225–29 and accompanying text.
261. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 543–44, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981); see also
Morgan, supra note 21, at 19 (stating that North Carolina’s attorney general sought the
enactment of section 75-1.1 “to stop fraud and deception”).
262. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection
Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 168–69 (2011); Lovett, supra note 20, at
724–26.
263. See Federal Trade Commission (Wheeler-Lea) Amendments of 1938, ch. 49, sec.
3, § 5(a), 52 Stat. 111, 111 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012)); see also
Averitt, supra note 229, at 231–35 (discussing the Supreme Court decisions in deception
cases that led to the 1938 amendment to section 5, as well as the content of the 1938
amendment).
264. See supra notes 225–29 and accompanying text; cf. CARTER & SHELDON, supra
note 11, § 3.2.4, at 180 (opining, on a nationwide basis, that “[i]f a court or jury finds for
the jury on a common law fraud count . . . the court must, as a matter of law, find a
[section 5 analogue] violation”).
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Possible Objections to the Suggested Approach

One might respond that the approach proposed in this Article
would not be better than selective upgrading and its near relatives.265
The predicted objections, however, are unpersuasive.
First, one might object that limiting per se violations to instances
of explicit or semi-explicit upgrading is too restrictive—i.e., that
courts should continue to engage in selective upgrading in some cases.
Under the approach proposed here, however, courts would still have
options for finding a violation of section 75-1.1 in the absence of
express statutory language. For example, they could apply the publicpolicy aspect of unfairness.266 They could also decide that a
defendant’s conduct satisfies another part of the standards for
unfairness or deception.267 The difference would be that courts would
not face the daunting challenges posed by selective upgrading.268
Second, one might say that this Article proposes to replace a
single-stroke analysis—a decision that all instances of a particular
predicate violation do or do not satisfy the conduct standard under
section 75-1.1—with a less categorical analysis.269 That is true, but
courts are already hesitating to engage in the single-stroke analysis.
By crafting less categorical alternatives to selective upgrading—the
near relatives—courts have shown that they see the categorical nature
of selective upgrading as a problem, not as a desirable feature.270
Finally, one might argue that replacing selective upgrading with
the public-policy aspect of unfairness would replace one nebulous
265. See supra notes 93–163 and accompanying text (showing problems with the
current near relatives of per se violations and with the current standards for selective
upgrading).
266. See supra notes 205–34 and accompanying text.
267. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548–49, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981)
(establishing standards for deception claims under section 75-1.1); see also Bumpers v.
Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 367 N.C. 81, 87–88, 747 S.E.2d 220, 226–27 (2013) (refining these
standards); Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2050–56, 2070–72 (giving an overview of
the current standards for unfairness and proposing revisions to those standards).
268. See supra notes 7, 37 and accompanying text (defining per se violations); supra
notes 94–110 and accompanying text (describing cases in which courts have recoiled from
selective upgrading).
269. Compare supra notes 7, 36–37 and accompanying text (defining per se violations
as having this effect), with supra notes 208–34 and accompanying text (discussing the
criteria for the public-policy aspect of unfairness).
270. See, e.g., Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 67, 71, 529 S.E.2d 676,
680, 683 (2000) (rejecting the argument that a predicate violation “constitut[ed] a violation
of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1,” but “agree[ing] with the practice of looking to [the predicate statute]
for examples of conduct to support a finding of unfair or deceptive acts or practices”
(emphasis added)); see also supra notes 121–22, 129–36 and accompanying text (discussing
other decisions that apply the near relatives of per se violations).
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analysis with another. To be sure, the FTC’s criteria for public-policybased unfairness require judgment calls.271 Even so, these criteria are
better defined than the current North Carolina criteria for selective
upgrading. North Carolina decisions, after all, do not expressly state
criteria for selective upgrading; one has to distill the criteria from a
group of opinions.272 If courts consult the FTC’s criteria for publicpolicy-based unfairness, they will find standards that at least begin to
solve this problem.273 Further, a court that applies the FTC standards
can take guidance from explicit decisions of courts and the FTC, as
well as thoughtful commentary, on the public-policy aspect of
unfairness.274
CONCLUSION
Per se violations of section 75-1.1 have powerful effects across
entire categories of conduct. For good reason, courts have become
reluctant to create these effects without legislative endorsement. The
multiple theories that courts have used to express this reluctance,
however, have created a morass.
Courts can begin to find their way out of this morass by avoiding
ambiguous language like “as a matter of law” and “may be.” They
can improve things further by avoiding the near relatives of per se
violations. The near relatives might have allowed a compromise in
past cases, but they have given today’s courts a confusing menu of
standards for deciding the role of predicate violations. Finally, by
limiting per se violations to those that the General Assembly has
explicitly recognized, and by applying the public-policy aspect of
unfairness in all other cases, the courts can end their struggle with
selective upgrading.
As a group, these changes will make the law under section 75-1.1
more stable, rigorous, and predictable.

271. See 1980 Statement, supra note 225, at 1075–76 (stating these criteria); supra notes
221–30 and accompanying text (discussing these criteria); see also MANNE, supra note 243,
at 30–34 (criticizing recent FTC unfairness enforcement approaches as too unpredictable).
272. See supra notes 52–56, 139–51 and accompanying text (inferring and discussing
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